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ABSTRACT
POST-CONFLICT RECOVERY OR CONFLICT RECURRENCE: A COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS OF ECONOMICS, COLONIAL HISTORIES, AND NATURAL RESOURCE
MINING IN BURKINA FASO AND TOGO
SEPTEMBER 2021
IZABELA KNAP FRECHETTE, B.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Meredith Rolfe
What are the factors that contribute to peace after civil conflict? What are the factors that
contribute to conflict recurrence after civil conflict? In this comparative analysis, Burkina Faso’s
military coup in 1988 and Togo’s military coup from 1987-1990 provide two most similar cases that
allow for a better understanding of what leads to peace or conflict recurrence. Colonial histories,
economics, and natural resource mining are three major factors present in this comparative case
analysis that explain why Burkina Faso’s conflict has ended with peace while Togo’s conflict has
recurred.
Through a colonial history analysis, the importance of colonial extractive institutions
becomes clear in both the economic development and the patterns of conflict of each country. The
institutions from the colonial administration in each state have shaped the institutions after
independence. This has resulted in poor levels of development and ineffective institutions and
systems of governance. Moreover, colonial asymmetric intervention and the resulting treatment of
ethnic groups connects to post-independence ethnic inequalities and tensions that have fueled
conflict recurrence in Togo. The clear ethnic oppression of the Kwa peoples in Togo has fueled the
continuation of conflict. In comparison, the lack of clear ethnic oppression in Burkina Faso
contributes to how peace developed after conflict.
The economic analysis here presents the issues of how poor economic performance and
lower levels of development can fuel conflict and vice versa. Both countries are underdeveloped and
suffer from poor institutions. In addition to this, there are also issues regarding protectionism.
Burkina Faso has very strong economic protections which have prevented serious issues of
economic volatility, but these protective measures have also contributed to limited growth. Togo on
the other hand has very few economic protections which have resulted in a highly volatile and
vulnerable economy. Additionally, economic decision making and diagnostics in both governments
are considered. In Togo, a poor economic diagnosis had resulted in a serious economic crisis before
iii

the start of the conflict. Burkina Faso on the other hand did not suffer from poor economic issue
diagnostics and therefore did not suffer the same consequences.
Finally, through an analysis of natural resource mining policies in both Burkina Faso and
Togo, it become clear that there are very different opportunities for human development which is
key in conflict prevention in this analysis. In Burkina Faso mining policies allow for better levels of
human development while in Togo mining policies prevent opportunities for improved human
development. Here, it becomes clear that economic growth is not as important as policies promoting
human development in efforts to promote peace and prevent conflict recurrence.
The combination of colonial histories, issues of economics and economic development, and
mining policies are studied in this research to clarify why Togo experienced conflict recurrence while
Burkina Faso had lasting peace. Clearly, economic growth as evidenced by the Togolese experience
does not prevent conflict recurrence. Instead, better opportunities for human development and a
more stable economy provided the basis for peace in Burkina Faso. Mining policy in Burkina Faso is
the source of the opportunities for human development. Moreover, colonial histories account for
institutional quality, ethnic divisions, and levels of development in both Togo and Burkina Faso. By
addressing colonial histories and generating a better understanding of their impact on present-day
societies, peace and conflict can be better addressed. Moreover, it becomes clear that opportunities
for human development present themselves as a way to obtain peace after civil conflicts.
Key Words: conflict, durable peace, post-conflict recovery, economics, human development,
military coup, economic development, colonial history, international development, West Africa
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Introduction:
Why do some conflicts end with durable peace and others recur or seem to be never ending?
To better understand why conflicts either successfully end or recur, it is important to look at the
both the politics and the economics of the country in question. This thesis is focused on post
conflict recovery and conflict recurrence from both an economic development perspective and a
political perspective. By conducting a comparative case study between two conflicts, one in Burkina
Faso and the other in Togo, issues such as colonial histories and the resulting institutions, ethnic
fractionalization, economic performance, natural resources, and mining policies prove to be
instrumental in understanding why conflict has ended or continued in the cases studied. Colonial
histories, especially the presence of asymmetric intervention, prove to be a major variable in
clarifying why the Togolese conflict continued while Burkina Faso’s conflict ended in peace.
Based on this comparative study, the major explanatory variable between the different
outcomes of each case study is the experience each country had under colonialism. Specifically,
Togo experienced asymmetric intervention by the German and French colonial administrations; by
choosing to support the Ewe ethnic group over the Kabye, the German and French colonial
administrations gave more power to one ethnic group which generated the political power imbalance
between the two very similarly sized groups. This explains the higher level of ethnic tensions
between the two small ethnic majorities and the resulting unstable governance that can be seen in
both the economic analysis and the historical analysis presented here. Burkina Faso on the other
hand had a large ethnic majority which was supported by the French colonial administration which
helps to explain the lack of ethnic tensions and the political power of the Mossi ethnic group.
Moreover, natural resources, specifically those that can be mined like gold in Burkina Faso and
phosphates in Togo can serve as a major source of income for the state and the population.
However, given different approaches to governing these natural resources and differing mining
policies, Burkina Faso has been able to provide the population more opportunities to improve
human development which has likely helped to prevent conflict recurrence. Togo, on the other
hand, has limited phosphate profits only to the government which has cut off the opportunity for
Togolese people to improve their level of human development through the mining of natural
resources.
This research contributes to the existing understanding of conflicts, conflict recurrence, post
conflict peace, the sources of instability in underdeveloped countries, economic development, and
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the role that human development has in all these different literatures. This thesis provides an in
depth look at two conflicts in West Africa with a focus on the politics, the colonial influence on
post-independence societies, and the economic factors that tie into peace and conflict. Additionally,
the focus on human development in both conflicts fills in a gap in the literature about the wellbeing
and quality of life of people living in conflict prone areas and how this contributes to peace or
conflict recurrence. Finally, this research provides a critique of World Bank development strategies.
The layout of the research and findings is as follows. The first section explains the literature
that this research is based on and contributes to. The second section provides the case background
with a focus on the colonial and post-colonial histories of Burkina Faso and Togo. This colonial
history and its influence on independent Togo and Burkina Faso will be analyzed. The third section
is focused on each specific conflict which is explained and analyzed. Then, the fourth section first
provides an analysis of the economic history of each case and secondly provides an analysis of the
importance of mining in each country. This economic analysis will be followed by the conclusion
which includes areas for further research.

Section 1: Literature and Theory
The basis of this thesis is rooted in the literature and theory on durable peace. Durable peace
after civil wars is focused of how to end conflict and how to make that peace last in the long term
rather than the short term. There are multiple variables that contribute to creating a durable peace.
Factors that will be present in this analysis are as follows. There are economic and development
factors both from internal and external actors. Then, there is also the importance of ethnic divides
within nations that can contribute to or hinder the development of durable peace. Finally, the way
the civil war ended also plays a crucial role in how to create durable peace. Each of these factors is
examined in the literature on durable peace and each plays an important role in clarifying what
works and what does not work in creating durable peace.
The literature on durable peace highlights the importance of economic factors in
determining the source of conflict and the likely remedies for the effect war has on a country’s
economic health. It is important to understand that the infrastructure and the economy of a state
that experiences war will be damaged resulting in the fall of per capita income measures (Addison,
2020). Moreover, the longer the war is, the worse the economic damage will be (Chen, Loayza, and
Reynal-Querol, 2008). This means that wars clearly influence the economy of the state where
violence takes place. Moreover, there are general patterns in the economies of countries that face
2

multiple if not protracted wars and therefore have trouble finding a durable peace. Many of the
countries that are at the greatest risk of conflict are the world’s poorest countries, 70% of which are
in Africa (Tschirgi, Lund, and Mancicni, 2010). What this shows is the importance of a healthy
economy with low poverty levels and open political society for avoiding conflict and creating
durable peace. Additionally, external aid once violence has ceased plays an important role in creating
a stable environment where durable peace can develop (Collier, 2009). Nikolas Emmanuel stresses
that when aid providers back peace processes with financial resources there is a significantly higher
likelihood that peace will last longer than in conflicts where there is no external aid funding (2015).
However, economic development aid is different and is criticized in this analysis. As for states
themselves, Mason et al find that should a government address the population’s grievances after war
by restoring a better level of economic wellbeing, resumption of civil war can be avoided (2011).
States can address the issue of economics and development through fiscal strategies, welfare
policies that address inequalities, education, and restructuring imports and exports. First, the import
and export sectors can be key in rebuilding a state’s economy after civil war, especially if that state
has high concentrations of natural resources. Tony Addison stresses that while imports and exports
sectors are key in the economic recovery after conflict, especially exports, they must not be driven
by only external demand, there needs to be more than just market forces in play (Addison, 2020).
External demand serves as the main driver of economic recovery and can generate the income that
is necessary for reconstruction spending by the government but cannot be the only source of
economic growth (Addison, 2020). Here, Addison stresses the importance of control over recovery
by those who have been affected by conflict.
Addison also emphasizes the importance of diversifying the export sector to help speed up
growth of the state economy and to allow for the process of rebuilding to begin. External demand
may be the driver of growth but maintaining a diverse exporting sector and maintaining the interest
of state recovery at the forefront of decision making is key in the stable economic recovery that
leads to durable peace. Moreover, Addison considers rich country protectionism and the lack of
development finance as factors that can hinder this economic growth in post conflict states (2020).
The focus here is on the ability of states to rebuild their economies after conflict through their
import and export sectors which depend on the interests of the state and are confronted by
challenges of other more powerful states
Import and export sectors are decidedly not the only vehicle for economic growth, in fact
domestic economic issues such as education, jobs, national expenditures, land reform, and fiscal
3

measures play a major role in economic recovery from civil conflicts. Paul Collier in a piece from
2009 emphasizes the importance of a fiscal strategy that includes low taxation, high aid, low
inflation, and a higher level of scrutiny towards public spending (Collier, 2009). Moreover, Collier
emphasized the importance of jobs for young men, to take out a significant portion of likely
combatants and satisfy their economic needs, and deep cuts in military spending (Collier 2009). The
allocation of military spending to other public resources is also supported by Chen, Loayza, and
Reynal-Querol in their 2008 piece on the aftermath of civil wars. By cutting military spending, the
national government signals its commitment to ending conflict and its interest in addressing the
needs of the population during recovery. With higher scrutiny towards public spending, there comes
scrutiny towards the different effects war has had on different people and how dynamics are thus
created. This is vital in addressing the needs of the population after conflict, to both remedy the
initial causes of conflict and to prevent additional conflict. Moreover, land reform also plays a major
role in economic development and stability in post conflict settings. Specifically, if land reform is
consistent, democratically enacted, and done on a significant scale, lasting peace is more likely to be
a result (Ioris and Ioris, 2018).
It is imperative to remember that issues of economics and development can help in creating
durable peace but can also hinder the ability of states to develop peace in post conflict settings. Like
threats to political stability, economic inequality and unemployment serve as threats to the creation
of a durable peace in post-conflict settings. There is the danger of education contributing to the
recurrence of conflict but only in the case where employment opportunities do not keep up with
pace of education (Ishiyama and Breuning, 2012). There is also the issue of land reform, which is a
thinly understood concept in the realm of creating durable peace. Failure to conduct land reform
significantly, democratically, and consistently will damage the chances for durable peace (Ioris and
Ioris, 2018).
In a similar vein to inequality and discrimination in economics, there is the importance of
resources, especially natural resources. Peace has already been determined to be shorter after
conflicts over natural resources because of the importance of such resources makes them a prize
worth fighting for (Rustad and Binningsbo, 2012). This means that peace after conflicts over natural
resources already face a much more difficult track to lasting peace. Distribution of natural resources
significantly shorten post conflict peace duration by about half the length of peace periods after
other conflicts (Rustad and Binningsbo, 2012). Rustad and Binningsbo also test financing and
aggravation mechanisms for addressing conflicts over natural resources and find no effect. These
4

last findings on the importance of natural resources and financing and aggravation mechanisms are
however contested by the results shown by Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner (2009) while also
confirmed by the results of Østby, Nordås & Rød (2009). These conflicting findings are likely due to
the fact that Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner’s work instead focuses on the availability of resources as a
factor of feasibility for belligerents, rather than the motivation, to start or continue conflict.
Another consistently important topic in the literature about factors that contribute to peace
in post conflict settings is societal and political reconstruction in addition to institutional reforms. A
key element of these reforms is the proper and fair representation and equitable living opportunities
of the people of the state. Institutional guarantees for political inclusion and support for the
economic interests of ethnic groups and communities that were most heavily affected by the
violence is key to creating lasting a durable peace (Ioris and Ioris, 2018 and Gurses and Rost, 2013).
Moreover, security and good governance are also key to creating durable and lasting peace as shown
by Phil Vernon’s 2020 recognition of negative peace (improved security) and positive peace
(improved quality of life). From broader outcomes such as democracy and overall good governance
there is the increased focus on reforming and reintegrating the military in a way that it creates a
diverse array of officer appointments, civilian oversight, and nonpoliticized civilian control (Berg,
2020). Moreover, implementing an open political system after civil wars and creating electoral
reforms that allow for proportional representation, especially after negotiated settlements, helps to
increase the durability of peace after civil war (Walter, 2004, Keels 2018, and Gurses and Rost,
2013). Furthermore, ongoing reforms are stressed as important to maintain peace especially in the
case of protracted conflicts (Busumtwi-Sam, 2002). Reforms to the electoral process and addressing
the issue of proportional representation is key in post conflict settings in combination with
addressing grievances of war survivors and ex-combatants.
There are reforms that have been noted in the literature on durable peace that damage the
prospects of creating the stability and security that is necessary for peace. The exclusion of specific
factions from the officer corps exacerbates grievances and facilitates insurgent mobilization (Berg,
2020). Politicizing police officer appointments, distributing rents through armed forces, and allowing
the military to use force unconstrained can increase the risk of renewed fighting and create insurgent
groups from those excluded soldiers (Berg, 2020). Additionally, by exploiting regime control over
resources and increasing levels of repression, security forces successfully contribute to the
development of insurgent forces who will increase the likelihood of renewed civil war (Berg, 2020).
Moreover, poor governance in the distribution of benefits and poorly implemented democracy can
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contribute to recurrence of conflict (Busumtwi-Sam, 2002 and Molemele, 2015). Finally, multiple
sovereignty remains a threat to peace, but is dependent on the willingness of dissidents to rebel,
something that can be addressed as discussed earlier (Mason et al. 2011). Avoiding discriminatory
and exclusionary policies at the level of individuals is key to achieving a lasting and durable peace in
the literature.
In addition to post conflict reforms, how the war ended also plays a role in the development
of lasting a durable peace. Caroline Hartzell addresses this topic through her empirical research and
finds that both military victories and negotiated ends to civil wars result in stable peace, depending
on multiple other factors, and that the existing research that pinpoints military victories as the most
damaging and therefore least likely to result in peace is questionable (Hartzell, 2009). Moreover,
there is evidence that wars ending in rebel groups’ decapitation are still capable of recurrence
because rebel groups may be able to reorganize (Ryckman, 2020). This suggests that rebel leader
decapitation merely results in a short-term peace and not a lasting and durable peace. Moreover,
there is no evidence that conflicts that end in both government victory and rebel leader decapitation
recur (Ryckman, 2020). In the cases where wars end short of a decisive victory, such as temporary
truces, negotiated settlements, or military stalemates, there is evidence that humanitarian aid is
effective and least likely to undermine peace (Narang, 2014). The durable peace literature highlights
the importance of the trickle-down effects that the way a war ends can affect how peace is built.
There are other factors that come from the way a war ends that can serve as obstacles to
generating durable peace. Rebel group victories can result in a more durable peace but only if the
new rebel regime can survive the first few years after the termination of conflict (Mason et al, 2011).
On the other hand, government victories create a stable peace early on, but these regimes can
become increasingly unstable overtime as it takes some time for rebels to regroup (Mason et al,
2011). These structural and agency issues are not all that contributes to peace agreement failures.
With rebel groups there is also the threat of renewed conflict if, as previously mentioned, there is
only rebel group decapitation and no structural reforms implemented to address the grievances of
that rebel group (Ryckman, 2020). The durable peace literature emphasizes that the way wars end
can have cascading effects from higher level negotiations to the lowest level of individual impacts
and effects. When wars end, there are still going to be lasting effects on those who were either
directly or indirectly affected by the conflict. Without addressing these small-scale motivations to
fight, as shown here, the prospects for peace are low.
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Ethnic divides also play a role in whether durable peace is created in the aftermath of civil
wars. How ethnic groups interact after conflict overshadows the level of violence during war
(Gurses and Rost, 2013). By looking at the tensions between ethnic groups, the literature highlights
the value of addressing grievances and tense social relations between ex-combatants. These results
emphasize the importance of forgiveness in cases of ethnic group based civil wars since
demonstrations can result in violent clashes between different groups (Kijewski and Rapp, 2019).
Addressing the needs of different factions in terms of power sharing rather than organizational
structures is also key to post conflict reform leading to durable peace (Hartzell, 2009).
Discrimination and exclusion, especially in the case of ethnic groups, serve as a major spoiler of
peace efforts. If there is political and economic discrimination against one of the ethnic groups
involved in the conflict, then conflict is likely to resume (Gurses and Rost, 2013). This is due mainly
to either the creation of new grievances or the perpetuation of grievances that existed during the
conflict.
In addition to creating post conflict peace, a key focus in this thesis is on human
development. The concept of human development is focused on the concepts of wellbeing,
freedom, the state of education and healthcare, and overall quality of live for each individual (Sen,
2010). Naila Kabeer writes that the true aim of development is intended to improve human
wellbeing and expansion of choice for each individual (Kabeer, 1994). Human development shows
the inequalities that are missed by the measures often used in economic development literature and
is therefore more useful in the analysis of inequalities that lead to conflict and violence. Additionally,
Martha Nussbaum writes about human development and the capabilities approach in terms of “what
people are able to do and able to be” while linking these capabilities to living a good life and the
concept of human dignity (Nussbaum 2011, 100). Human development is therefore the concept of
development not in economic terms, but in terms of the ability of individuals to live a dignified life
that is healthy and guided by their own decision making. Moreover, human development is
connected to conflict according to Namsuk Kim and Pedro Conceição (2010). Specifically, lower
levels of human development increase the risk of conflict outbreak while conflict contributes to
lower levels of human development (Kim and Conceição, 2010). Therefore, policy measures that
work to sustain or improve human development can indirectly lower the risk of conflict (Kim and
Conceição, 2010). Therefore, more opportunities to improve human development play an important
role in economics as well as in conflict prevention.
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Another important concept addressed in this paper is the resource curse which is when
resource rents are used in such a way that they promote imports rather than food production, foster
large-scale and often inefficient models of industrialization which result in unbalanced growth, and
difficulty in changing industrial policies due to structural inflexibility built into the economy (Karl,
1999). The resource curse proves to have an institutional nature according to Mehlum Halvor, Karl
Moene and Ragnar Torvik who write that natural resources constitute both growth losers and
growth winners (2006). They find in their work that the difference for these experiences comes from
the quality of institutions: when institutions are grabber friendly, or in other words institutions that
suffer from weak rule of law, malfunctioning bureaucracy, corruption and rent-seeking and
production are competing activities, aggregate income is pushed down, but when institutions are
producer friendly, in other words institutions that attract entrepreneurs into production and rentseeking and production are complementary, resources will raise income (Halvor et al, 2006). Natural
resources can be a key factor in economic development as they provide a very clear route to
integration into the global economy through exports. However, the distribution of resources proves
to be a major driving factor of ethnic income inequality which can be a driver behind conflict
(Lessmann et al, 2017). The homogenous spread of resources and resource revenues can spur
national development while the uneven spread of resources and resource revenue distribution is
positively correlated with civil war onset (Lessmann et al, 2017). Thus, Lessmann et al conclude that
resources can be a blessing for resource rich regions but may prove to be a factor in conflict onset in
ethnically divided nations.
Moreover, violent conflict is more likely in areas where local communities have been
excluded from decision-making processes, when only a few people are able to reap the economic
benefits, and when extractive industries clash with the cultures and traditions of local people or align
with pre-existing tensions (Grzybowski, 2012). Natural resources in fractionalized countries prove to
contribute to lower incomes and can contribute to fighting activities between rivaling groups
(Hodler, 2006). Additionally, income inequality rises due to natural resources in ethnically polarized
societies, while income inequality falls with the discovery of natural resources in homogenous
societies (Fum et al, 2010). Finally, the direct effect of resource wealth tends to increase risk of war:
ethnic fractionalization in combination with resource wealth seems to lead to greater risk of war, but
this is not true for linguistic or religious fractionalization (Brunnschweiler et al, 2009).
Additionally, the structure of economies may actually be the route through which natural
resource dependence provides incentives for conflict (Wegenast et al, 2014). There is evidence that
8

the past impacts of natural resource production are what conflict onset is most responsive to, the
impact of natural resources is independent of state strength, agricultural dependence actually drives
the link between primary commodities and conflict, and finally that natural resources are associated
with shorter wars that are more likely to end in military victory (Wegenast et al, 2014). Non-oil
resource rich countries prove to have much larger improvements in their Human Development
Index (HDI) scores in comparison to countries without minerals (McMahon et al, 2014). Benefits
have come mainly from foreign direct investment (FDI), export revenues, and fiscal revenues and
are highly dependent on infrastructure benefits and strong linkages to other industries, both of
which require cooperation between public and private sectors (McMahon et al, 2014). Overall,
natural resources are most beneficial to countries who have strong governing institutions which see
the value in the equal spread of the benefits from resource extraction. Rent-seeking behavior and the
compiling of revenues into the hands of the few only serve to increase the likelihood of conflict as
natural resources can be used to fund rebellions.
Another important basis of theory used in this thesis is focused on colonial histories and the
corresponding impacts on institutions and economic development after independence. Robin Grier
(1999) finds that the level of education at the time of independence is key in explaining the
development gap between former British and former French colonies. Moreover, the duration of
colonization and the identity of the colonial power are significantly and positively related to
education (Grier, 1999). Grier writes that the French approach to colonization did put effort into
alienating the native culture while British colonization did not. As a result, the British left more
educated populations than the French did which resulted in the larger development gap between the
two post-colonial societies even though education rates after independence may have converged.
Outside of education and more focused on colonial institutions and how successfully
colonial governments are translated into post-colonial societies is Pierre Englebert’s 2000
publication Pre-Colonial Institutions, Post-Colonial States, and Economic Development in Tropical
Africa. Englebert argues that the extent to which colonial state institutions clash with the precolonial
state institutions accounts for what differentiates state capacity and economic growth across the
region. This means that the greater the incongruence between pre- and post-colonial institutions, the
greater the relative power payoffs to domestic elites of adopting neo-patrimonial policies over
developmental ones. The more illegitimate the colonial state, or the more the colonial state clashes
with the pre-colonial institutions and state structures, the more likely that post-colonial political
9

elites are to resort to neo-patrimonial policies which lead to poor governance and economic
stagnation (Englebert, 2000). Overall, Englebert shows that African countries have paid a high price
for not questioning the state structures inherited from colonialism, mostly in the form of foregone
economic growth.
Another commonly cited work on institutions and colonization is Acemoglu, Johnson, and
James’ The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation. Acemoglu
et al write that in areas where Europeans faced high mortality rates, usually due to diseases in the
area that Europeans had no natural immunity to, they would not settle and instead would set up
extractive institutions which have persisted to the present. As a result of these extractive institutions,
colonies usually have less secure property rights, more distortionary policies, lower investment in
human and physical capital, and as a result fail to achieve a greater level of income. There are three
economic mechanisms discussed by the authors that lead to the persistence of extractive institutions.
These include unwillingness on behalf of post-colonial elites to incur the costs of introducing better
institutions, smaller elite groups means the gains from extractive institutions will be greater for each
individual creating an incentive to keep extractive institutions, and finally if irreversible investments
are made that are complementary to a particular set of institutions, they will be more likely to
support those institutions.
There is another body of literature relevant to this thesis which is focused on the politics of
military coups in African countries. Pat McGowan and Thomas Johnson’s work African Military
Coups D’état and Underdevelopment: A Quantitative Historical Analysis provides the
understanding that military coups are the principal form of regime change on the African continent
and that they can happen under any kind of political system. McGowan and Thomas find that
military coups are far more frequent in states that were under French colonialism and that those
countries whose economies grew most rapidly had the fewest military interventions. Specifically,
African states whose industrial employment increased the most between 1960 and 1978 had
significantly fewer military interventions between 1960 and 1982 than those states who had less
effective industrial programs. This becomes a cycle of poor economic performance and military
coups: economic stagnation and decline lead to military coups and military coups in turn lead to
more economic decline and uncertainty.
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Another work focused on African military coups is Thomas Johnson, Robert Slater, and Pat
McGowan’s Explaining African Military Coups D’état, 1960-1982. In this article, the authors find
that African states that have relatively dynamic economies, societies that were not high socially
mobilized before independence and have maintained or restored some degree of political
participation and pluralism have experience far fewer coups, attempted coups, and coups plots than
states with the opposite set of characteristics. Moreover, the likelihood of a coup increases when the
military's role in society is not to defend against external threats and when civilian and military
institutions, values, and roles are blended. Moreover, military cohesion and political centrality are
two features that have been determined to lead to more coups. When the military of an African state
is large and ethnically homogenous the more the military becomes involved in politics. Furthermore,
early social mobilization in African societies and early rapid industrialization of capital cities are also
strongly related to the event of subsequent military coups. There are also major economic features
of African states which do not experience many, if any, military coups. These characteristics are as
follows: the ratio of industrial jobs to all other forms of employment increased the most between
1960 and 1978, states whose economies grew in the late 1960s, and finally those states who’s mid
1960’s export performance was superior. States whose commodity exports became less diversified in
the start of the 1960s have experienced more military coups than those who’s economic or market
dependency lessened in the same period.

Section 2: Case Selection
The approach to selecting cases followed the logic of most similar cases. The initial data for
potential cases came from Flores and Nooruddin’s article “Democracy under the Gun
Understanding Post Conflict Economic Recovery”. While their work was more focused on how
post conflict democratization has a negative effect on economic recovery and that outright military
victory more frequently results in a longer lasting peace, the article proved to be a good source for
finding potential cases. Flores and Nooruddin’s article did have some issues with data, so ensuring
that the conflict data was complete was important in case selection. In order to ensure the selection
was of the most similar cases, both had been under the same colonial administration and each
conflict had to have taken place during a similar time period so as to avoid issues with studying
conflicts in completely different time periods. Additionally, similar geographic location became
another constraint on case selection due in part to the limited availability of data. To narrow down
the possible options for case studies even further, there was additional data collection from the
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World Bank to find out which cases from Flores and Nooruddin had information on the levels of
education achieved before, during, and after each conflict. The variables used here were the adult
and youth literacy rates from five years, or as close to five years as possible give the gaps in data,
before each conflict and five years after each conflict ended.
Although the Flores and Nooruddin article does have a gap in the data for Togo for the year
1991, it is still clear that the conflict was not over or that at the very least there was conflict
recurrence, thus the decision to use Togo as a most similar case with Burkina Faso which has not
had a prolonged conflict or conflict recurrence. The thinking behind this data constraint was based
on the logic of human capital being beneficial to economies which will be addressed in the theory
and literature section of this thesis. Given these constraints on data and the focus of this research,
Togo and Burkina Faso were the best “most similar'' cases for study in this thesis.
Finally, it is important to recognize that the cases selected for this analysis were based on the
concept of most similar cases and colonial history was, at first glance, one of the major variables that
was to be held constant between the case studies. However, given the in-depth case study format of
this analysis, colonial histories are discovered to be a key explanatory variable of the different
outcomes of each conflict of study. This difference comes in the form of asymmetric intervention
by German and French colonial administrations in Togo where very small ethnic majorities were
treated very differently and resulted in serious ethnic tensions that outlasted colonialism. Burkina
Faso, on the other hand, did not experience asymmetric intervention on behalf of the French
colonial administration given the very clear difference in size and power of the ethnic majority, the
Mossi.

Section 3: Case Background
In order to better understand the origins of the two coups of study in this thesis, the ethnic,
colonial, and post-colonial background of Togo and Burkina Faso are provided here. Each history
allows for a better understanding of just how deeply connected colonialism is to each conflict.
Colonial policies regarding ethnic groups as well as extractive institutions are shown to have shaped
both Burkina Faso and Togo to an extent that is present during and after each conflict of study.
Togo’s history will be introduced first and analyzed and Burkina Faso will be introduced second.
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Pre-conflict History of Togo:
Ethnic History of Togo:
Togo has a rich and diverse ethnic history with over 50 different ethnic groups (Lasisi, 1993).
There are two major subgroups used to identify the different ethnic groups; ethnic groups located
north of 8.5 ° latitude are known as the voltaic of Gur and is made up of the Kabri (Kabye) , Losso,
Bassari, Konkomba, Tyokossi, and the Dagomba while those ethnic groups south of 8.5 ° latitude
are known as the Kwa and are made up of the Ewe (Evhe), Mina, Aja, Fon, Ana (Yoruba), Adangbe,
and the Akposso (Lasisi, 1993). Each ethnic group in Togo fitted into one of two political cultural
groups. The ministates or segmentary societies were among the southern Gur speaking people which
include the Konkomba, Kabri, Losso and Bassari and some of the Kwa-speaking groups. Here,
political power was more dispersed with social and religious activities that took on the form of agegrades and ancestral worship. Then, there were the megastates of centralized polities which included
the Kotokoli, Tyokossi, Dagomba, and Mamprusi of the north and the Ewe, Mina, Fon, and Ana of
the south where political authority rested in the hands of either priest kings or hereditary monarchs
with a stronger sense of territoriality (Lasisi, 1993). There is clearly a plethora of social, religious, and
political organizational structures amongst these different ethnic groups in Togo and under
colonialism these groups were forced to assimilate to a European structure of politics and
socialization. This has resulted in the unequal distribution and access to social and economic
opportunities for members of different ethnic groups based on the concept of ethnic interest and
consciousness (Lasisi, 1993). The most recent survey of Togo’s population in regard to proportions
of different ethnic groups is as follows: Adja-Ewe/Mina 42.4%, Kabye/Tem 25.9%, ParaGourma/Akan 17.1%, Akposso/Akebu 4.1%, Ana-Ife 3.2%, other Togolese 1.7%, foreigners 5.2%
(World Factbook, 2021b). This recent survey provides a look into both the overall population, and
the general effect of colonial policies regarding ethnic groups in Togo. Looking at the percentages of
ethnic groups in Togo, and the treatment of ethnic groups by the German and French colonial
administrations, it becomes clear that Togo proves to be a case of asymmetric intervention. Without
a clear ethnic majority, colonial policies sided with one ethnic group over the others which had
serious and long lasting effects which are made clear in the next section.
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Colonial History of Togo:
Togo’s colonial history began in 1884 with the signing of a treaty between Germany and
King Mlapa, the priest king of the Mina Ethnic group, where Togo became a protectorate of
Togoland (Lasisi, 1993). Ethnic resistance to colonialism varied: Togo being an indigenous Ewe
name generated a sense of belonging amongst most of the Kwa groups while the Gur groups
outwardly resisted colonial rule (Lasisi, 1993). Here, the sense of belonging was due to how Togo
was named as an ethnically Ewe name. This connects directly to how the German and French
colonial administration favored the Ewe ethnic group, the small ethnic majority of Togo, through
asymmetric intervention. By favoring one of the smaller ethnic minorities in Togo through the
choice of name for the protectorate under German rule and eventually through French colonialism
and into independence, the Ewe people have been able to reap the benefits of this colonial
favoritism while the Gur peoples outwardly resisted colonial rule. This connects clearly to the
tensions that developed between the Kwa people and the Gur people in Togo and is directly related
to the power imbalance between the Kabye group and the Ewe group which has affected the style of
governance and the prospects for peace after the conflict of study.
Togo’s geographic borders were decided by a number of agreements signed by the French in
the East and the British in the West between 1885 and 1907 which resulted in approximately 50
kilometers of coastline and a hinterland between the 6th and 11th degree north parallels (Lasisi,
1993). This area is within the borders of the endemic malaria area in Africa and as a result was not a
settler colony (see figure 1). Under German colonial rule, Togo was an extractive colony and took
on some elements of German culture such as the imposition of a paternalistic autocratic
administration system, the construction of roads and railways, the introduction of new legal and
educational systems, and a market economy that was heavily reliant on cash crops for exportation
and the importation of European industrial products (Lasisi, 1993). Additionally, the German
colonial administration started a military recruitment strategy, which was continued by the French
that targeted specific ethnic groups from the Gur region of Togo including the Kabye, Losso,
Bassari, and Kotokoli (Lasisi, 1993). This military recruitment strategy tied directly to ethnic
inequalities and the ethnic dynamics of the conflict of study. By recruiting only specific ethnic
groups, especially those who are part of the Gur people who openly resisted colonialism, French
colonialism generated a system of favoritism towards the Kwa peoples, especially the Ewe, while
oppressing and cutting out political opportunities for the Gur people by recruiting them into the
military. This has undoubtedly contributed to the political inequality between the two major ethnic
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groups in Togo which has fed into the political survival strategy of constantly fighting for positions
of power. As a result of this, governance in Togo after colonialism has been volatile and the shift of
power from the Ewe to the Kabye in 1967 set off a serious period of instability given the sudden
shift in power dynamics.
While some ethnic groups in Togo did have a somewhat similar system with a centralized
government, such as the centralized polities of the Kotokoli, Tyokossi, Dagomba, and Mamprusi of
the north and the Ewe, Mina, Fon, and Ana of the south, the legal and educational systems in
addition to the market economy were dramatically different to the pre-colonial ethnic societies in
Togo. This ties directly into the literature on colonialism and the resulting preference for neopatrimonial policies over development policies which become clear in the section on the postcolonial history of Togo. What is key to remember is that Togo was established as a state purely for
capitalist reasons and as such was developed as an extractive colony resulting in the lasting colonial
institutions that can be seen today. During World War One both Great Britain and France invaded
Togo starting August 7, 1914, and this invasion eventually resulted in the start of the French and
British colonial administrations of Togo in 1922 (Lasisi, 1993).
Under French control, the German administrative, social, and economic policies continued
but were eventually adjusted to fit more with the characteristics of French colonialism (Lasisi, 1993).
What makes Togo an interesting case of French colonialism is that it was not considered a colony
from the beginning, but rather a distinct entity under international law which meant that French
assimilation was not a policy that France could pursue as with the rest of French colonies in West
Africa (Lasisi, 1993). Under control of both Great Britain and France, there were two Togo’s that
were split only on a geographic ideology which resulted in the splitting of all existing ethnic groups
along the French-British border of the two Togo’s (Lasisi, 1993). In addition, the different
administrative and fiscal strategies on either side of the British-French border further aggravated
different ethnic groups including the Ewe, Buem, Akposso, Konkomba, and Tyokossi (Lasisi, 1993).
As a result, the Ewe ethnic group was one of the first under colonialism to demonstrate ethnic
solidarity, as they were negatively affected by the arbitrary British-French border (Lasisi, 1993). Their
association with European culture through Christianity and formal western education under colonial
rule allowed the Ewe to take on a more direct strategy by sending their protests to both the British
government and President Woodrow Wilson of the United States (Lasisi, 1993). Furthermore, the
Ewe assimilation to European culture seems to have given them an advantage in terms of power
considering it gave them the ability to reach out to international powers at the time. Clearly,
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assimilation through education and religion gave the Ewe peoples an advantage under colonial rule
and in fighting against policies they did not agree with e.g., the arbitrary British-French border that
split their ethnic group and disturbed their trade policies. This is also further proof of French
colonial favoritism and even support towards the Kwa peoples, especially the Ewe people. This has
impacted power dynamics between ethnic groups by providing a political platform and political
space for the Ewe people while the Gur peoples, especially the Kabye, have been silenced and
forced into a political disadvantage through military recruitment strategies in combination with the
clear evidence of colonial preference for supporting the Ewe people.
The French government was also aware of this issue but instead treated it as a British
problem so there was no action on either side as the British and the League of Nations refused to
recognize the Ewe as a centralized state (Lasisi, 1993). As a result, the Ewe people were able to
assimilate to colonial rule and made very clear efforts to use this as a way to appeal to colonizers to
address the issue of splitting an ethnic group with an arbitrary boundary. These efforts to assimilate
to colonial rule may and the resulting favoritism of the Ewe people likely influenced the postcolonial power that the Ewe people have in Togo. Additionally, the strategy to vie for power within
the colonial system proves to have become a kind of survival strategy; by fighting for and gaining
power within the different colonial and post-colonial systems in Togo people have been able to
survive. This post-colonial power of the Ewe people is reflected in the conflict studied here from
1987-1990 as the ethnic power dynamics during the coup of study reflect these ethnic tensions that
were started and developed under French colonialism. This political battle for power throughout
Togo’s history is the result of asymmetric intervention and colonial favoritism of the Ewe ethnic
group. Through the favoritism of the Ewe, other ethnic groups, especially the Kabye who are the
second largest ethnic group in Togo, were put at a serious disadvantage. This favoritism of a small
majority of the population in Togo put the balance of power into a disproportionate advantage for
the Ewe at the cost of the Gur people, especially the Kabye, and as a result has contributed to
grabber friendly institutions in addition to the unstable political environment of Togo during
independence and after the conflict of study.
During World War II, more ethnic fractionalization and related issues began to arise in Togo
under colonial rule relating to the arbitrary British-French boundary. As the Ewe sense of
nationalism continued to develop, there were adverse reactions from other ethnic groups in Togo.
The Dagomba ethnic group was in favor of the arbitrary boundary as it reunited the Dagomba precolonial state and allowed them to enjoy the benefits of being a united ethnic group under colonial
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rule (Lasisi, 1993). Then, in 1956 a UN organized vote resulted in British Togo being integrated into
the Gold Coast which meant the end of Ewe hopes to unify under a single state (Lasisi, 1993). As a
result, the Ewe, in order to maintain their political and economic privileges and in order to survive
under colonialism, began to fight for the integration of all ethnic groups in a new state within
French mandated territory (Lasisi, 1993). This movement by the Ewe people in combination with
the concentration of infrastructure in the southern Kwa areas and Ewe monopolization of the
corresponding economic and political opportunities resulted in other ethnic groups in Togo realizing
their underprivileged positions under colonial rule (Lasisi, 1993). The Ewe’s strategy of assimilation
to the existing colonial power structure to increase their own power in addition to the support
generated by asymmetric intervention on behalf of the colonial administrations of Togo proved have
carried on into post-independence Togo.
Due to colonial politics and competition between the French and the British, the French
encouraged and supported the creation of the first political organizations in the area by the Ewe
because they disliked the support that the British were getting from key Ewe leaders like Sylvanus
Olympio and Augustone de la Souza (Lasisi, 1993). Moreover, the Ewe leaders were encouraged by
the French to continue their political activities as the French accelerated the territory’s movement
towards self-government and independence (Lasisi, 1993). Here, it becomes even more clear that the
Ewe people were supported by the French colonial administration through asymmetric intervention
that lasted throughout Togo’s colonial era. This provides clear evidence that political competition
between colonial states, Britain and France in this case, resulted in rushed efforts to allow selfgovernance and independence in colonial states and territories that were otherwise too unstable
under colonial infrastructures and state apparatuses to become stable independent states. This also
connects to the literature on coups in Africa. By pushing for the start of political activities under
French colonialism, Togo started to fit the pattern of colonial history that contributes to African
military coups. In their efforts to maintain more control over Togo than the British, to avoid the
absorption of French Togo into the Gold Coast, and to reduce criticism of their policies in Togo,
the French colonial administration worked towards gaining the favor of the Ewe ethnic group by
offering independence and self-governance (Lasisi, 1993). This effort to start self-governance under
colonialism gave a distinct political advantage to the Ewe ethnic group, favored during colonialism
due to German and French asymmetric intervention in addition to Ewe efforts to assimilate and the
fact that French colonial institutions were located mostly in Kwa areas where the Ewe people lived.
Moreover, by starting self-governance under French colonial rule, Togo’s post-colonial institutions
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were forced to be built upon French colonial institutions. Thus, colonial institutions in Togo stuck
due to both their extractive nature, the advantages of keeping ineffective institutions for elites, and
finally because they were the base from which Togo was given the opportunity to develop as an
independent state under colonial rule. Moreover, the grabber friendly extractive institutions and the
unstable political environment of Togo after independence are the result of colonial asymmetric
intervention and favoritism of the Ewe ethnic group.
As self-governance was allowed in Togo, the struggle for ethnic solidarity transformed into
the struggle for central political power (Lasisi, 1993). Due to the uneven spread of colonial
institutions the Gur people were marginalized in the fight for central power in the newly selfgoverning Togo (Lasisi, 1993). This meant that the Ewe people who were able to benefit the most
from colonial institutions in both economic and political realms were the most involved and most
powerful in the political battle for central control of Togo (Lasisi, 1993). This inequality in the
political power afforded to the two major ethnic groups in Togo is also reflected in the coup of
study. Once again, the Ewe held virtually all political power until the military coup, which was led by
the Kabye minority group which made up the greater part of the military. The two Ewe dominated
parties that were fighting for control were the Comite D’union Togolaise (CUT) and the Parti
Togolaise du Progrès (PTP) (Lasisi, 1993). In 1950 and 1956 the PTP won the majority of seats in
the territorial assembly resulting in Nicholas Grunitzky being appointed as Prime Minister (Lasisi,
1993). Then, in 1958 power was transferred to Sylvanus Olympio of the CUT and Togo gained
independence under his rule as prime minister on the 27th of April 1960 (Lasisi, 1993).

Post-Independence History of Togo:
Even after independence in Togo, the social, economic, and political inequalities that
developed during French colonialism remained and the new government did nothing to improve the
inequalities meaning that ethnic groups only became even more divided under self-rule in Togo
(Lasisi, 1993). As a result, the Kwa people led by the Ewe were able to dominate the government
and the economy while the Gur peoples dominated the army (Lasisi, 1993). It is important to
remember that Gur domination in the army was the result of German and French asymmetric
intervention policies restricting the recruitment of soldiers under colonialism to the Kabye, Losso,
Bassari, and Kotokoli ethnic groups (Lasisi, 1993). This organization of government and army by
ethnic groups, conducted first by German and French colonial administrations and then continued
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under self-governance, is key in understanding how ethnic tensions in combination with
discriminatory practices led to the military coup of study. By restricting positions in the army to only
Gur peoples under colonial rule and after independence, these ethnicity-based policies set the
ground for a military coup. A united military under one major ethnic group, the Kabye, as stated by
McGowan, Johnson, and Slater, can allow for the political involvement of the military and be the
perfect setting for a military coup. On the thirteenth of January 1967 there was a military coup, and
all governing power was given to Gnassingbé Eyadéma, of the Kabye ethnic group, who assumed
leadership of the nation under the reasoning that the army took control of the nation in order to
prevent an imminent civil war from the culmination of very clear tension in the nation (Polity5,
2018b; Lasisi, 1993). This military coup and the corresponding ethnic tensions fit very well with the
literature and theory on African military coups and colonial influence in ethnic tensions. Clearly,
French colonial persecution of and discrimination against specific ethnic groups carried into postindependence Togo.
Eyadéma remained in power in Togo since 1967 after arresting all opponents who were also
mostly of Ewe descent and formed his one-party state the Rassemblement du Peuple Togolaise
(RPT) (Polity5, 2018b; Lasisi, 1993). Under Eyadéma’s control of Togo, the Kabye ethnic group has
continued to be favored within the government and in the “distribution of social and economic
infrastructures” (Lasisi, 1993). This favoritism towards Eyadéma’s own ethnic group, the Kabye, and
other Gur peoples generated opposition from the Ewe and other Kwa ethnic groups (Lasisi, 1993).
This ethnic tension because of Eyadéma’s military coup has fueled the continuity of conflict in
Togo. This change in the ethnic group holding central political power disrupted the ethnic power
dynamics that developed under German and French colonialism. In addition to the clear favoritism
of the Kabye ethnic group and the oppression of the Ewe under Eyadema’s rule, ethnic tensions
continued to flare and as a result contributed to conflict recurrence. This also connects back to the
literature on durable peace. By failing to treat the different ethnic groups of Togo equitable,
Eyadéma created a setting prone to conflict. Power within Togo was split so that the Ewe
dominated the modern sector of the economy while the Gur people monopolized both political and
military power (Lasisi, 1993). The ethnic fractionalization and the resulting military coup and military
heavy control of the government were the direct result of colonialism and colonial policies by both
the German and the French in Togo. German policies to have mostly Kabye, Losso, Bassari, and
Kotokoli man the armies and the French perpetuation of this policy allowed for an ethnically
homogenous army in the position to become politically involved, which are the two major factors in
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McGown, Johnson, and Slater’s breakdown of African military coups. This means that colonial
policies have influenced Togo’s military coup, even after independence. Colonial favoritism and
discrimination towards different ethnic groups in Togo was the beginning of ethnic tensions in Togo
which have undoubtedly contributed to the coup of study and the continued tensions and conflict
present currently in Togo. Moreover, Eyadéma’s assumption of power in 1967 and the resulting
change in which ethnic groups were being discriminated against set the grounds for the conflict of
study in 1986.

Pre-conflict History of Burkina Faso:
Ethnic History of Burkina Faso:
Upper Volta, now known as Burkina Faso, before colonization was a section of Africa that
was made up of many different ethnic and social groupings. These groups were classified along a
spectrum of decentralized groupings that were governed by elders and local chiefdoms that covered
modest populations and territory to the more centralized and hierarchical Mossi empire which ruled
over a more sizable population and engaged in conquest and tribute extraction from subjugated
peoples (Harsch, 2017). Eventually, the Mossi empire established or imposed chiefdoms throughout
the central plateau (Harsch, 2017). The geographic distribution of these different groups of people
was as follows: those who were more decentralized, the Lobi, Dagara, Birifor, and Oule, lived on the
border of present-day Burkina Faso and Ghana and had no defined territorial organization because
they had no chiefs (Harsch, 2017). The main social unit of these groups was instead small farming
groups who would only combine in instances of necessary military defense or when there was a need
to decide family inheritance (Harsh, 2017). The Gourounsi was another group similar to the Lobi
and the Dagara who acknowledge chiefs that performed religious rituals and controlled specific areas
of land including its allocations to different people and moreover recognized the roles of village
chiefs in their responsibility for organizing war parties in conflicts with neighbors or attacks by nonGourounsi (Harsch, 2017). Another group was the Dioula who were mainly scattered across the
western regions of current day Burkina Faso and engaged a great deal in heavy itinerant trade and
were more nomadic than other local ethnic groups (Harsch, 2017). The Dioula were linked together
through their Islamic faith and their trade networks and often established decentralized towns in
non-Muslim societies (Harsch, 2017). Finally, the Liptako people were members of a highly stratified
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Islamic emirate established in approximately 1810 which included free people, subordinate castes,
subjugated people, and slaves (Harsch, 2017). These different ethnic and social grouping throughout
the geographic area of Burkina Faso provide a social setting filled with multiple different ethnic
groups that generated their own political and social settings. The most recent survey of ethnic
populations in Burkina Faso is as follows: Mossi 52%, Fulani 8.4%, Gurma 7%, Bobo 4.9%,
Gurunsi 4.6%, Senufo 4.5%, Bissa 3.7%, Lobi 2.4%, Dagara 2.4%, Tuareg/Bella 1.9%, Dioula 0.8%,
unspecified/no answer 0.3%, other 7.2% (World Factbook, 2021a). These statistics on ethnic
proportions of the population reflect colonial policy and ethnic favoritism. Given the large ethnic
majority of the Mossi empire in Burkina Faso, there was no opportunity for colonial asymmetric
intervention which would have had a worsening impact on political power opportunities for
different ethnic groups. This helps to explain the lack of blatant and recorded instanced of ethnic
oppression after independence. This is key in understanding why Burkina Faso’s conflict of study
ended in peace rather than continued conflict as in the case of Togo. This will be shown in the next
section on colonial Burkina Faso.

Colonial History of Burkina Faso:
The French colonization of Burkina Faso, then known as Upper Volta, started in the
Yatenga Province where the lack of a strong Mossi empire presence in the area provided an avenue
for the French to claim the area as a French protectorate in 1895 (Harsch, 2017). Then in 1919
Upper Volta was established as a colony separate from Soudan and Haute-Senegal et Niger and
instead of becoming a large settlement colony, Upper Volta developed from an area of colonial
suppression to civil administration due to the lack of desire to pay for a strong military presence in
the area (Harsch, 2017). Moreover, Burkina Faso’s location is in an area that suffers from endemic
malaria which was likely another reason for Burkina Faso not becoming a settler colony (see figure
1). The state institutions introduced by the French during colonization consisted of were to collect
taxes, count and categorize the population, build and maintain roads, recruit labor, draft laws and
regulations, police, provide sanitation and basic health services, and to carry out other routine tasks
that were modeled after the French government serving as the metropole (Harsch, 2017). Once
again, the different ethnic groups in Burkina Faso each had their own methods of governance with
the Mossi Empire being the largest and the strongest. These differences in ethnic group governance
styles clashed with the colonial administration which, as in Togo, resulted in post-colonial
institutions that practiced more neo-patrimonial policies than developmental policies.
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Within these different colonial institutions there was a strict hierarchy at both state and local
levels: the senior positions were occupied by Europeans while junior posts were limited to Africans
who had learned to speak and possibly how to read and write in French (Harsch, 2017). This
connects heavily to colonial literature and theory as those who were favored by colonial authorities
were able to continue to hold this power, even after independence. Additionally, this selective
acceptance of different people under colonial rule connects to the issue of poor governance after
colonialism as very few people in Burkina Faso had the skills to handle a government based on the
European style. African civil servants were required to directly assist colonial local officials and staff
in the administrative office as interpreters, clerks, messengers, drivers, guards, and record keepers
(Harsch, 2017). This need for African civil servants led to the establishment of training centers for
these support personnel but very little in the way of creating actual schools which essentially ensured
the lowest rates of education and lowest rates of school attendance in Burkina Faso (Harsch, 2017).
These rates of education are key in understanding Burkina Faso’s development process, as stated by
Grier. In the more junior positions, African employees would often extort money, goods, or services
from residents as another a mechanism of survival and to gain income or to flex their newfound
power as the local associates of the French colonization process (Harsch, 2017). These practices
have carried over into the independence era of Burkina Faso as these corrupt practices helped to
keep high levels of colonial profits and cement loyalty to the colonial administration (Harsch, 2017).
Corruption was a survival strategy under French colonial rule which has been carried over through
time and is still present in Burkina Faso. Practicing corruption to continue to make high incomes
and gain higher amounts of loyalty through exploitation is a poor practice that has led to continued
corruption in Burkina Faso which has been a key reason for the multiple coups faced by Burkina
Faso, especially the one studied here in 1988.
The French colonial strategy was to initially destroy the pre-existing state structures, but this
eventually resulted in cooperation with chiefs rather than bypassing them due to the lack of educated
individuals that the colonial powers could work with to have direct colonial control in addition to
the threat of disease to colonial settlers (Harsch, 2017). French colonialism in Burkina Faso worked
through the Mossi empire, which inevitably resulted in the political advantage of the Mossi and
resentment from non-Mossi elites (Harsch, 2017). By working with Mossi chiefs rather than by
passing them and creating a completely military based colonial administration, there was no
asymmetric intervention that favored a large ethnic minority. As a result, there was no clear change
in political advantage for ethnic groups and the Mossi ethnic group maintained their political power
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under colonialism. This resentment from non-Mossi elites was not the result of asymmetric
intervention as ethnic tensions in Togo were. Rather, this resentment is instead the result of ethnic
groups being forced to subject themselves to colonial rule by the French colonial administration and
the Mossi chiefs due to their geographic location within the boundaries of Upper Volta. The issue in
Burkina Faso was not asymmetric intervention resulting in the uneven balance of power between
similarly sized ethnic groups. Instead, the issue was that the Mossi empire worked as an extension of
the French colonial administration which meant that all ethnic groups in the geographic area of
upper volta were forcefully subjected to colonial rule through the Mossi chiefs.
Once again, corruption ran throughout the colonial power and chiefdom ties: some chiefs
did take advantage of their positions as ties to the French colonial power by diverting revenues into
their own pockets given their newfound freedom from the old checks on their power (Harsch,
2017). These abuses of power and diversion of funds was especially prevalent in the judicial system
(Harsch, 2017). Moreover, the corruption of chiefs also reared its face in the overestimation of
subjects within a chief’s domain in order to increase the portion of colonial taxes imposed on the
population and in the colonial conscription of African peoples which was also under the control of
chiefs (Harsch, 2017). Military recruitment and conscription were an especially powerful form of
colonial power as it was compulsory and punishable by fine or imprisonment (Harsch, 2017). As
individuals were recruited into the colonial military of Upper Volta, they would be assigned to
different colonial projects including building the physical colonial infrastructure through the
construction of bridges, roads, railway lines, and administrative or private buildings (Harsch, 2017).
In addition to working on infrastructure projects, those who were recruited or conscripted in Upper
Volta were also subject to fighting on various European fronts during World War I (Harsch, 2017).
As for some of the existing ethnic groups in the geographic area of Upper Volta, there was
active resistance to colonization from some groups more than others. The Lobi people were one of
the major sources of direct resistance to French colonial rule as they fought against taxation, forced
cotton cultivation, and labor and military conscription and were involved in direct violence and
suppression in 1915-1916, the 1930s well into the 1940s and again in 1953 (Harsch, 2017). The
Mossi people who had been afforded an advantage by working with colonial powers had no
recorded instances of overt resistance, but when there was resistance, it was by villagers who were
resisting their chiefs in a form of indirect resistance to colonialism (Harsch, 2017). Mossi
cooperation with colonial France was key in the French maintaining control over the area, but it was
done in the interests of the Mossi who wanted to stay within the higher echelons of society and
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maintain some semblance of the control they had before colonialism. In 1932, French colonial
powers made clear their immense power over Upper Volta by further dividing the existing ethnic
groups in the area by incorporating a large portion of the Upper Volta colony into the Ivory Coast,
making Ouahigouya and a small part of Dedougou part of Soudan (Mali), and attaching Gourma and
Liptako to Niger (Harsch, 2017). This division of Upper Volta forced the Mossi into a subordinate
position but chiefs continued to cooperate with colonial forces through the collection of taxes and
labor recruitment in an effort to convince the French of their loyalty in the hopes of winning the
reconstruction of the former colony and in turn their empire under colonialism (Harsch, 2017) This
decision by the French colonial administration further proves that the French support of Mossi
chiefs was done solely to make it easier to control Burkina Faso’s population with less use of
colonial resources. This decision to divide the existing ethnic groups in Burkina Faso including the
Mossi reveals that there was no clear favoritism towards the Mossi empire, but it was rather a case of
how to expend the least amount of resources during French colonial rule in Burkina Faso. This
political strategy proved the influence and power of colonialism over the remnants of the Mossi
empire who were initially far too powerful and unwilling to let the start of French colonization begin
within their empire. The efforts of the Mossi to continue a positive relationship and maintain their
place of power under colonialism may have been in the name of survival but can be most clearly
connected to the fight for political power under French colonialism.
In September 1947 Upper Volta was reconstituted as an overseas territory under the colonial
borders (Harsch, 2017). This was done not because of Mossi loyalty, but in an effort to counter the
wave of post-World War two anti-colonialism (Harsch, 2017). As Upper Volta was relabeled a
territory, political life began to develop while still under the control of France. There was the
elimination of forced labor and oppressive indigenat legal statutes and the allowance of some
freedom of the press and freedom of assembly (Harsch, 2017). French territories were then allowed
new assemblies elected on a restricted franchise where they had some say over budgets and public
works (Harsch, 2017). This level of social mobilization before independence connects directly to the
literature on coups as societies with higher levels of social mobilization before independence were
more prone to military coups (McGowan et al, 1984). As some colonial policies were lifted in an
effort by the French to avoid scrutiny during Post-war decolonization waves, the French maintained
a foothold in Upper Volta resulting in the limited political development and dependence on the
stability of the French control over the territory. Upper Volta’s years of increasing political
independence as a French territory meant that the beginning of the state of Burkina Faso was both
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heavily influenced, limited by and heavily reliant upon the stability afforded by French control and
influence. Moreover, the institutions that Burkina Faso’s government was built on were those very
same extractive institutions that were put in place by the French colonial administration.
As a French territory afforded greater, albeit limited, political freedoms Upper Volta began
its foray into party politics. The Mossi continued to push for the restoration of the old borders
which had allowed them to be the strongest and most unified ethnic group within Upper Volta
(Harsch, 2017). Once the restoration of the old borders came in the late 1940s, the Mossi chiefs
were able to maintain authority at the local level but still had to participate in party politics (Harsch,
2017). However, the more progressive Voltaic nationalists formed the Rassemblement
Democratique Africain (RDA) which was at its start a militant party aligned with the French
communist movement (Harsch, 2017). The first assembly election took place in June 1948 where
participation was restricted to less than 5% of the adult population of Upper Volta and resulted in
the overwhelming majority win by Mossi chiefs (Harsch, 2017). However, by the mid-1950s the
RDA was able to demonstrate their growing electoral strength as they also tempered their initial
militancy and communist radicalism (Harsch, 2017). Moreover, the Mossi aristocracy began to break
apart as its faction ridden party developed a new alliance with the RDA resulting in a combination of
some of the Mossi elite with representatives of the very small elite of teachers and civil servants,
Mossi and non-Mossi (Harsch, 2017). In 1956, in a political landscape with no mass parties and a
political strategy that forced the small parties to appeal to villagers and the urban poor with highly
specified campaigns, the RDA won dominance in the territorial elections (Harsch, 2017). Moreover,
due to the high salaries given to those in elected office (Harsch, 2017) the pattern of corruption in
government, especially electoral fraud and violence, continued with the introduction of party politics
in Upper Volta due to how corruption became a strategy for survival under French colonialism.
Political tensions between the RDA and the Mossi aristocracy continued through the 1950s.
Neither party was clearly fighting for independence as there were clear prospects for further African
citizenship rights under the continued French rule, and both parties saw that this continued support
for the French would only be an asset (Harsch, 2017). In October of 1958 Ouezzin Coulibaly was
replaced as central leader of the RDA by Maurice Yaméogo while Mogho Naaba Kougri, the Mossi
successor, made a proposal for a government of “Union and Public Safety'' that was immediately
rejected (Harsch 2017, 20). Kougri’s response was an attempt at a show of force that backfired and
resulted in the increase of anti-chief sentiments throughout Upper Volta (Harsch, 2017). Eventually,
anti-independence sentiments of the RDA became explosively clear after Yaméogo ordered two
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independence parties, the MLN (Mouvement de Libération Nationale) and the PAI (Parti Africain
de l’Indépendance), to be subjected to repression, threats, and bribery along with police harassment
resulting in the driving out of opposition deputies in the assembly or their absorption into the RDA
(Harsch, 2017). Clearly, French colonialism has had a lasting impact on politics in Upper Volta.
From the reliance on French support and the hope for expanded rights under French rule, it seems
to have been an issue of willing dependence on the French. This relationship can be seen through
Yaméogo’s decision, after De Gaulle announced in 1959 that French territories could claim
independence without losing French assistance, to arrest the six opposition figures who proposed a
“natural union” government to help build the new state in its newfound independence (Harsch,
2017). Clearly, even when allowed to develop political parties as a French territory, French colonial
policies, and the related reliance of Upper Volta’s political elites on French support remained
influential.

Post- Independence History of Burkina Faso:
Yaméogo continued his efforts to remain in close contact with colonial French powers even
throughout Upper Volta’s independence in 1960, this included making only minor changes to the
state structures inherited from French colonial authorities (Harsch, 2017) These efforts to maintain
colonial institutions were clear and according to the literature it is very likely that these efforts have
hurt Burkina Faso’s chances of developing out of the poor extractive colonial institutions and
structures put in place by the French. These issues regarding poor institutions were worsened by
Yaméogo’s efforts to increase the number of trained officials working within the government as
higher numbers of employees did not increase government efficiency and instead introduced even
more corrupt officials to the government of Upper Volta resulting in the disappearance of financial
allocations from the reserve bank (Harsch, 2017). Clearly, French influence and corruption ran
rampant throughout the history of Upper Volta and have had lasting effects on the stability and
governance of Burkina Faso into the present day.
Serious political and social issues became present in Upper Volta in the 1960s starting with
Yaméogo’s efforts to decrease public expenditure through 20% wage cuts (Harsch, 2017). These
wage cuts resulted in the largest protest in the history of Upper Volta and Yaméogo’s transfer of
power to Lieutenant Colonel Sangoule Lamizana (Harsch, 2017). It remains unclear why these wage
cuts were introduced, but the reaction clearly shows resistance from a large part of the population to
losing a portion of their income due to a decision that was made by a publicly corrupt government
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that relied heavily on French support. Moreover, with the transition of power to Lieutenant Colonel
Sangoule Lamizana, the government of Burkina Faso came under military control and influence
which is key in the onset of military coups.
Under the control of Lieutenant Colonel Lamizana, public displays of wealth were far more
limited which allowed for anti-corruption efforts to be imposed and economic austerity efforts to
increase without public backlash (Harsch, 2017). The austerity efforts included salary reductions of
10%, the elimination of hundreds of state employees, and the imposition of patriotic contributions
equivalent to half a month's pay (Harsch, 2017). The result of these austerity measures after five
years was that Upper Volta succeeded in clearing its debt arrears, strengthened tax collection, and
had saved enough money to permit spending on public salaries and new investments (Harsch, 2017).
In this case, strong austerity measures taken on by Lamizana who was not outwardly flexing his
wealth, as monetary exuberance often reasonably led to suspicions of corruption in a very poor
country like Upper Volta, led to positive effects on the debt balance and opportunities for
investment.
However, since state institutions that developed out of colonial institutions did not yet reach
the northern area of Upper Volta, chiefs began to appeal for restoration of their previous privileges
under the condition that they pledge their allegiance to the government in place and do nothing to
undermine governmental authority (Harsch, 2017). Mossi chiefs regained their former privileges in
October of 1968 and the political consequences included the outcry of students and women stating
their dislike of this backwards policy regarding chiefs and party politicians once again began to push
for civilian government rather than continued military control of Upper Volta (Harsch, 2017). This
is another example of how a favored ethnic group under French colonialism, the Mossi, has been
able to maintain its powerful position even after colonialism. However, there is a distinct difference
in this case in comparison to the Togolese case; here the Mossi in Burkina Faso are such a large
ethnic majority that even in the face of opposition from those who did not support Mossi chiefs
regaining their former privileges they were able to maintain their power. This is in conjunction with
the fact that the Mossi were the ethnic group supported by the French colonial administration
without any major ethnic group opposition, unlike in Togo where the Ewe ethnic group was
marginally larger than the Kabye group and were supported by the German and French colonial
administrations through asymmetric intervention which then resulted in the higher levels of ethnic
conflict and cleavages in Togo in comparison to Burkina Faso.
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In June 1970 a new constitution was adopted, and Gerard Kango Ouedraogo of the RDA
became the prime minister of Upper Volta while the military retained its substantial role in political
and state affairs (Harsch, 2017). Serious environmental issues developed in Upper Volta in 1972 and
1973 in the form of a severe drought that forced very high levels of mass migration and resulted in
widespread crop failures (Harsch, 2017). In combination with this serious environmental issue, the
history of corruption and profiteering in Upper Volta reared its face once more in the form of state
officials profiting from grain hoarding which then drove up grain prices even higher (Harsch, 2017).
This pattern of corruption in government officials has lasted through the history of Upper Volta
ever since the start of the colonization process which means that corruption became a means of
surviving if not thriving for those working in the government of Upper Volta. Moreover, the strong
presence of the military in political and state affairs sets the stage for the conflict of study based on
the literature of coups in the African continent.
On the 8th of February 1974 Lamizana suspended the constitution, dissolved the national
assembly, and banned party activities ending the Second Republic abruptly (Harsch, 2017). This
reveals the beginning of a pattern in Upper Volta which has continued into the history of Burkina
Faso, military coups d’état are now becoming more frequent occurrences in the first two decades
after independence. In October of 1977 a new constitution entrenched a formal military rule of
Upper Volta through direct election of the president without the former constitution’s transitional
provisions (Harsch, 2017). Lamizana retained the presidency and the history of those in control of
politics being rich and the people of the country being poor continued (Harsch, 2017). This proves
to be a key difference between the conflict backgrounds between Burkina Faso, where the source of
conflict was about economic inequality and poor governance, and Togo where the conflict was
about ethnic groups and the resulting power struggles. The following unrest continued to escalate
and culminated in the November 25th, 1977, coup led by Colonel Saye Zerbo where he detained the
president and many of his officials, scrapped the constitution, dissolved the national assembly,
suspended political parties, and prohibited all political activities (Harsch, 2017). Under Zerbo,
Captain Thomas Sankara worked as the secretary of information and encouraged truthful reporting
resulting in issues of embezzlement and poor public resource management becoming clear to the
population and to the world (Harsch, 2017). The feelings junior officers had of frustration and
contempt for senior officers, civilian politicians, and political institutions were the result of how
junior officers considered such people and institutions to be corrupt, indecisive, and inefficient
(Hasrch, 2017). These thoughts of the Upper Volta government are not inaccurate and have been
28

characteristic of the government in Upper Volta since the time that civilians were given positions
within the colonial structure and institutions put in place by the French government.
Once again, the deep disenchantment with the government resulted in another coup d’état
led by Jean-Baptiste Ouedraogo and the Council of Popular Salvation (CSP) on November 7th,
1982, where he became president and named Thomas Sankara as prime minister on the 10th of
January 1983 (Harsch, 2017). In his position as prime minister, Sankara was provided with just the
platform he needed to press for continued reforms and win greater support from the general public
(Harsch, 2017). As Sankara garnered increased support from the public, especially as a leftist, it is
possible that French interventionist policies were behind Sankara being purged from government on
May 17, 1983 (Harsch, 2017). By continuing the dependent relationship with France, the
government of Burkina Faso was set up in a way to allow such interventionist policies. This means
that, once again, French colonialism in Burkina Faso played a key role in the political unrest by
setting the seeds of insurrection and the military coup that followed in 1988. In the resulting
aftermath, Sankara came back into power by declaring over the radio the overthrow of Ouedraogo
and announcing the Conseil National de la Révolution (CNR) as the new government (Harsch,
2017). Upper Volta was then renamed Burkina Faso, and it remained very autocratic and
undemocratic as political parties were banned, and the third republic was dissolved just like its
predecessors (Harsch, 2017). Moreover, the military presence within the government remained the
same even with the introduction of a very limited civilian presence in the government. This military
presence in the government plays a key role, just as the dislike for Thomas Sankara, in setting the
scene for the conflict of study that took place in 1988.

Section 4: Case analysis
Togo’s Coup of Study:
Brewing discontent with Eyadéma’s rule, and his oppression of the newly displaced Kwa
ethnic groups, resulted in a number of attempted coups one of which in September 1986, reached
the level of an armed conflict (UCDP MTD state-based violence). By turning the initial power
dynamic of ethnic groups, a result of colonial asymmetric intervention, in Togo on its head and
oppressing the Kwa groups and the Ewe people, Eyadema created an atmosphere perfect for
renewed and long-lasting conflict. On the evening of 23 September 1986, fighting broke out in the
capital Lomé (UCDP MTD state-based violence). Some 60 to 70 armed men attacked strategic
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targets, including the radio station, military barracks housing President Eyadéma, and RPT
headquarters with the goal of deposing Eyadéma and installing a new government under the
leadership of MTD leader Gilchrist Olympio and a dissident army officer names Francisco Lawson
(UCDP MTD state-based violence). It is important to recognize that Gilchrist Olympio was the son
of Sylvanus Olympio, and important Ewe political figure. This means that ethnic tensions, which
initially developed under German and French colonial rule in Togo and were exacerbated by
Eyadéma’s oppression of the Ewe people during his rule, played a key role in the onset and
continuation of this conflict of study. Following a night of clashes, the rebels were defeated by
government forces (UCDP MTD state-based violence). What is important to recognize here is that
Eyadéma failed to address the grievances of those affected in his coup that resulted in his rise to
power. This clear connection to the literature on rebel groups and durable peace also ties to the new
oppression of the Ewe ethnic group under the formerly oppressed Kabye military government. By
switching the ethnic group in control of the Togolese government during Eyadéma’s coup and then
oppressing the Ewe majority ethnic group, Eyadéma put himself in a position to face continued
outcry and resistance to his rule. These ethnic tensions and the resulting effect on conflict
recurrence are directly related to how German and French colonial administrations in Togo
conducted asymmetric interventions by supporting the marginally larger Ewe ethnic group and
oppressing the marginally smaller Kabye ethnic group.
There was increasing opposition, which included high levels of public outcry due to a trial of
students who, in October of 1990, were accused of distributing anti-government propaganda and
resulted in the deaths of 28 demonstrators on April 11th, 1991, in the Be Lagoon in Lomé (UCDP
Government of Togo one sided violence). President Gnassingbé Eyadéma met with opposition
leaders to hold a conference to restructure the political system which ended on August 28th, 1991,
even though Eyadéma did try to suspend its proceedings (Polity5, 2018b). The results of the
conference were twofold. First, there was the step towards democratization with the legalization of
opposition parties which then triggered very high levels of social and political unrest that lasted for
years to come (UCDP Togo State-based Violence). Second, there was the adoption of an electoral
timetable which involved a referendum on the new constitution on February 9th, 1992, which then
created a prime minister position where some executive powers were transferred to the new prime
minister Koukou Koffigoh while Gnassingbé Eyadéma maintained his position as president (Polity5,
2018b). There was continued political instability and power struggles within the government that
culminated in October of 1992 when part of the army held the interim parliament hostage resulting
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in opposition parties and labor unions declaring a general strike on the 16th of November of 1992
which lasted several months and had a severe impact on the Togolese economy (UCDP
Government of Togo one sided violence). Then, in January 1993, there were intensified
demonstrations as Eyadéma ended the period of transition. This included the death of 19 peaceful
protestors at the hands of security forces on January 25th and as a result an estimated 250,000
Togolese people fled the country during the violence (UCDP Government of Togo one sided
violence). International pressure then forced Eyadéma’s regime to agree to elections in August of
1993 (UCDP Government of Togo one sided violence). The August 1993 presidential elections were
held with opposition boycott and allegations of electoral fraud and the candidacy of the main
challenger being rejected by the supreme court on a technicality (Polity5, 2018b). As a result,
Eyadéma was given the election as all the other opposition candidates continued to boycott elections
through 2002 (Polity5, 2018b). This is an example of poorly implemented democracy which,
according to the literature on durable peace, is a major cause on conflict recidivism. Moreover, the
continued oppression and clear corruption during elections only served to worsen the situation and
make peace even more unattainable in Togo.
Gnassingbé Eyadéma died on February 5th, 2005, of a sudden heart attack and the military
high command then announced that Faure Gnassingbé would take over the presidency after his
father which contravened the constitution, and this resulted in charges of fraud and violent riots
which were quickly ended by the armed forces (Polity5, 2018b). It is common belief that this
unconstitutional transition of power from father to son was intended to maintain the dominance of
the Kabye ethnic group (Banjo, 2008). Thus, ethnic tensions play a major role in the politics of Togo
and may have an indirect effect on mining considering that positions in the mining sector are
considered highly prestigious (Banjo, 2008). Moreover, the unconstitutional appointment of Faure
Gnassingbé provoked a severe reaction by the military against demonstrators and members of
opposition parties resulting in the deaths of over 400 civilians in the months of April and May 2005
alone and over 10,000 more people to flee the country (UCDP Government of Togo one sided
violence). The next set of elections in March of 2010 also resulted in Faure Gnassingbé’s re-election
which once again stoked opposition claims of fraud and triggered protests (Polity5, 2018b). Clearly,
in Togo political tensions have remained high since the end of the conflict in 1990 and the political
monopoly of the Kabye ethnic minority may have an impact on how governance is conducted,
especially in the mining sector. Moreover, the blatant corruption in the democratic system of Togo
and the ethnic oppression conducted by the Kabye government only served to continue conflict in
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the state which has suffered from conflict recidivism ever since Eyadéma’s rise to power in 1967.
These ethnic tensions are the direct result of asymmetric intervention by the German and French
colonial administrations in Togo and have fueled the Togolese conflict since 1967 through to
present day.

Burkina Faso’s Coup of Study:
Burkina Faso’s conflict started with Thomas Sankara’s death in a coup led by military captain
Blaise Compaoré on October 15, 1987 (Polity5, 2018a). Sankara was displaced during the coup by a
rebel group called the Popular Front, which was led by Sankara’s former allies Compaoré, Lingani,
and Zongo (UCDP Burkina Faso Government Violence). There was an autocratic reform period in
1991 when a new constitution was being drafted while opposition groups boycotted the elections as
they were not allowed to challenge the Compaoré regime (Polity5, 2018a). Following the 1987 coup,
Blaise Compaoré became the new president, and the Popular Front was reorganized as a political
umbrella organization that replaced the CNR (UCDP Burkina Faso Government Violence). While
President Compaoré initially ruled together with Lingani and Zongo, the latter two were imprisoned
and executed after they allegedly plotted a coup in 1989 (UCDP Burkina Faso Government
Violence). Compaoré continued to run a military government until 1991, when a new nominally
democratic constitution was adopted. In order to run in the presidential elections, Compaoré
resigned from the military; he subsequently won a 7-year term as president after running unopposed,
as the opposition boycotted the election (UCDP Burkina Faso Government Violence). There was
then the creation of an electoral commission which was demanded by opposition parties on
February 21, 1998, and put into law on May 7th, 1998 (Polity5, 2018a). Then, despite multiple
boycotts Compaoré was re-elected with 87.5% of the vote on November 15, 1998 (Polity5, 2018a).
Compaoré kept his place as Burkina Faso President, winning the 1998, 2005, and 2010 presidential
elections (UCDP Burkina Faso Government Violence). Compaoré’s participation in the 2005
election was disputed, as the opposition parties claimed that he had already served his maximum of
two terms as stipulated in the 2000 constitution (UCDP Burkina Faso Government Violence).
However, Compaoré claimed that he was allowed to run for another two terms after the 2000
constitution was adopted (UCDP Burkina Faso government violence). Eventually, Compaoré was
forced to resign on October 31, 2014, and was then followed by Roch Marc Christian Kaboré, also
of Mossi decent, as the winner of the first fair presidential election with his party Movement for the
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People of Progress who claimed the merit of being the first peaceful and elected transfer of power in
Burkina Faso (Polity5, 2018a). This implementation of democracy proves to be a major difference
from Togo where an early push for democratization in 1991 with the legalization of opposition
parties resulted in a huge socio-political uproar. The different results from moves towards
democracy must be due to very different levels of social stability in each country as Burkina
successfully embraced democracy decades after the conflict while Togo’s push for democracy was
immediately after conflict. Clearly, timing of democratization matters.
Finally, it is important to recognize that nowhere in the Burkina Faso conflict was ethnic
oppression mentioned as an issue. In Togo, the Eyadéma regime oppressed the Kwa people and
openly favored the Gur peoples, especially the Kabye ethnic group as a result of colonial asymmetric
intervention. In Burkina Faso, there were no policies of ethnic discrimination that are available in
the existing literature on the conflict, the lack of clear ethnic oppression in Burkina Faso after the
1988 conflict undoubtedly contributed to the lasting peace.

Section 5: Economic Analysis
Another aspect of the Togolese and Burkinabe conflicts that is studied here is economic
history and capacity of both countries and how this has contributed to the conflicts and conflict
recurrence. This section will consist of an in-depth look into World Bank and IMF reports on the
economies of both countries around the time of each conflict and an analysis of mining in both
countries. The focus on mining is conducted in section 5b and provides an in depth look at natural
resources and how they can contribute to both conflict and peace through the variable of human
development. Moreover, this section will provide a detailed analysis of the successes and shortfalls
of a World Bank in the Togolese economy.

Section 5a: The Economies of Togo and Burkina Faso
First, Togo’s economic history and capabilities are analyzed. This section will first give a
general overview of the Togolese economy at the time of the coup of study and the pattern of debt
creation and amortization in the aftermath of the 1988 military coup. Then the efforts of the
Togolese government to address economic issues will be analyzed. Next, the level of protectionism
in the country and its effects will studied. Finally, a case study on a World Bank technical assistance
project will provide an opportunity to see the effects of World Bank involvement in Togo at the
time of the conflict and discern just how beneficial external interventions really are.
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The International Monetary Fund provides a look into the economic system of Togo just
after the conflict of study in their Country Report Togo - Recent Economic Developments from
1994. There are three major characteristics used to describe the external sector of the Togolese
economy: heavy reliance on primary commodity exports, large but slowly decreasing debt service
requirements, and finally a traditional role as the trade center for the region (Sacerdoti et al, 1994).
Togo as a coastal state does benefit from being a port that exports about one third of its total
imports to neighboring land locked countries (Sacerdoti et al, 1994). As a port country, exports play
an important part in earning for the Togolese government. A heavy reliance on exports for income
in Togo put the government and the people at the whim of global markets, especially considering
that the consistent weakness of prices for Togo’s exports (Sacerdoti et al, 1994). As a result of
adverse price and volume developments in Togo, there was a 43% decline in the value of exports in
1992-1993 while re-exports plummeted during the general strike from November 1992 to March
1993 (Sacerdoti et al, 1994). In the case of Togo, post conflict tensions represented by the 19921993 strike has a very heavy impact on the economy in terms of growth.
Moreover, in looking at Togolese debts, there is a clear connection between internal conflict
and the ability of the government to pay off debts. The slowly decreasing debt service requirements
were successful, but less so in the face of socio-political turmoil which warped the economic
numbers. At the end of 1993 Togo’s external debt amounted to CFAF 363.9 billion where CFAF 32
billion was the result of arrears (Sacerdoti et al, 1994). The steady reduction of the debt to GDP
ratio in Togo was from 94% in 1985 to 68% at the end of 1990 but increased to 103% at the end of
1993 due to the contraction in GDP (Sacerdoti et al, 1994). This provides a clear example of how
deeply intertwined politics and economics are. The general strike from 1992-1993 had a huge impact
on the economic performance of Togo (Sacerdoti et al, 1994). Additionally, in combination with the
general strike, dissatisfaction with the government grew as poor economic performance affected the
lives of Togolese citizens. This falls in line with the literature on conflicts and coups on the cycle of
economic performance and conflict; poor economic performance begets higher levels of
government dissatisfaction and conflict which then results in the cyclical worsening of the economy.
In addition to the influence of the external sector on the Togolese economy, there are
internal and more local sectors that are key in understanding the Togolese economy at the time of
the conflict of study. The most important activity in the informal sector was commerce which
accounted for over 80% of operations at the time (Sacerdoti et al, 1994). Within this informal
market most food stuffs were sold and a large portion of imported goods (Sacerdoti et al, 1994). In
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the informal sector most people were self-employed, in subsistence agriculture for example, and
their incomes were at or below the minimum wage which was the poverty limit (Sacerdoti et al,
1994). All workers in Togo were guaranteed a minimum wage which was determined by collective
bargaining by trade unions, employers, and the government for those who work in the formal
private sector (Sacerdoti et al, 1994). Moreover, real incomes in rural areas followed a downward
trend since the sharp drop in world prices for coffee and cocoa (Sacerdoti et al, 1994). For example,
the very poorest in Togo even before conflict were reliant on subsistence farming and about 50% of
the population was food insecure (Kjellstrom et al, 1987). In addition to falling incomes and
fluctuating prices, Togo also suffered from issues related to unemployment and population growth.
The yearly average of population growth in Togo was 3.2% and the growth of the labor force was
very similar (Sacerdoti et al, 1994). Estimates of the rate of unemployment were within the range of
16%-28% from 1991-1993, just after the conflict, and employment in the private and formal sectors
had been falling, reflecting the impacts of the continued political and social unrest after conflict
(Sacerdoti et al, 1994). The agricultural sector employed approximately two thirds of the total labor
force and to a certain extent absorbed those laid off from the modern sector (Sacerdoti et al, 1994).
With these consistent rates of unemployment, especially after the military coup in 1987, there was
undoubtedly dissatisfaction with the government of Gnassingbé Eyadéma which was likely a part of
the reason behind continued conflict in Togo. Moreover, with the rates of unemployment and low
incomes for a large portion of the Togolese population, there is once again a clear connection to the
cycle of poor economic performance resulting in continued conflict.
Outside of income and unemployment issues, there were also the efforts taken on by the
government to help address economic issues and shortfalls. The economic policy in Togo was based
on a policy of investment planning which allowed very limited government intervention and instead
left a very important role for the private sector which served as an important means for attracting
foreign capital (Sacerdoti et al, 1994). This policy was in part the result of World Bank projects from
1988 and 1987 that were focused on the privatization of textile mills and of parastatal companies
(see table 1). In light of this privatization policy, there were also severe shortfalls on behalf of the
ministry of planning which lacked transparency and suffered from administrative procedures that
prevented efficient preparation and financial monitoring of investment expenditure (Sacerdoti et al,
1994). This inefficient and non-transparent management of planning seriously affected the reliability
and efficiency of the ministry of planning. This poor governance was likely a result of the extractive
institutions that were set up in Togo under French colonial administration which put Togo at a
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severe disadvantage economically. Moreover, the asymmetric intervention by German and French
colonial administration in Togo undoubtedly affected the ability of Togolese people to govern in an
effective way when combined with extractive and grabber-friendly institutions. Here it becomes
clear that institutions and the asymmetric treatment of ethnic groups has had a negative impact on
the ability of Togo to become a developed country and to function with a stable and transparent
government. As a result, Togo has suffered from repeated and extended conflict.
However, even with these institutional and governance related issues, in 1988 and 1989 there
was progress in implementing structural reforms and financial adjustments under the IMF supported
adjustment program resulting in a budget surplus of 1.6% of GDP and a decline in the overall
financial deficit by 5.8% of GDP (Sacerdoti et al, 1994). In 1990 and 1991 the economic successes
of Togo began to change as continued social and political unrest severely affected revenue collection
which in turn had a negative effect on financial performance (Sacerdoti, 1994). From 1982 through
1991 there was a government liquidation and privatization reform program that reduced the
government’s portfolio from 73 to 30 enterprises (Sacerdoti, 1994). This effort to increase
privatization, a very neoliberal policy, in Togo did not seem to have been helpful with any social
unrest. Moreover, by increasing privatization, the ability of the government of Togo, which was
already limited given colonial institutions and a lack of transparency, to contribute to better
economic development continued to dwindle. This suggests a connection back to colonial
asymmetric intervention in Togo as the competition between the Kwa and the Gur peoples may
very well have resulted in privatization; by allowing private groups to take control, neither ethnic
group is put at an advantage or disadvantage in terms of economic power. The financial and
economic situation in Togo continued to deteriorate further in 1992 and 1993 as social and political
unrest continued to grow in severity especially given the general strike that was in effect for a
significant period in 1993 (Sacerdoti et al, 1994). Expenditures in Togo were also declining due to
the collapse of foreign investment as a result of political uncertainties which arose from the existing
sociopolitical unrest (Sacerdoti et al, 1994). This evidence of Togo’s economy after the 1987 military
coup provides a clear story of how social and political instability feed into economic issues, even if
there were some successes along the way. Togo’s economy suffered from weaknesses in efficiency
and transparency which only field both economic and sociopolitical ills.
In addition to inefficiency, there were also serious issues in addressing how to fix the
economy in the face of political turmoil. In an effort to address the worsening social and political
situation in Togo, the government decided in 1992 to continue the economic adjustment process
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with a comprehensive tax reform that included strengthening the tax administration and overhauling
the public sector (Sacerdoti et al, 1994). These efforts, however, were squashed and resulted in
further economic and financial management deterioration due to the general strike which was a
result of increased dissatisfaction with the government in November of 1992 through March of
1993 (Sacerdoti, 1994). This effort to address economic issues took the existing social and political
unrest for granted and instead resulted in worsened conditions. The government’s decision to focus
on economic and financial growth during a time of severe social and political unrest only
exacerbated the existing economic crisis on top of the social and political turmoil. Several measures
were passed in July of 1993 in an effort to increase public revenue collection, but they were delayed
due to the unsettled sociopolitical climate and eventually fell short in the aftereffects of the general
strike (Sacerdoti et al, 1994). There was a 64% drop in direct taxes on income due to the stagnation
of economic activity while the profits tax for enterprises fell steadily from CFAF 8.5 billion in 1990
to CFAF 3.7 billion in 1992 and CFAF 1.6 billion in 1993 (Sacerdoti et al, 1994). Moreover, in the
rundown of the political and economic crisis there was little success in curtailing Togolese
government expenditure (Sacerdoti et al, 1994). Clearly, social and political turmoil have had a
negative effect on economic development and growth in Togo in the early 1990s. This points
towards the importance of understanding how deeply connected society, politics, and economics are
especially in fragile post conflict settings. Any programming for economic and financial solutions
must be conducted in a way that is flexible and able to adapt to the social and political environment.
Forcing a project, whether it be on behalf of the state’s government, the IMF, the WB, or the UN,
in an unstable environment will only cause more damage as this Togolese example proves.
In addition to issues in addressing problems in the Togolese economy and as a consequence
of both the socio-political issues and the lack of economic protection in Togo, total export revenues
declined by 45% between 1991 and 1993 (Sacerdoti et al, 1994). The lack of economic protection in
Togo, a vulnerable underdeveloped country, meant that the already weak economy was subjected to
fluctuations in global prices and demand making economic stability with or without socio-political
turmoil virtually impossible. Togo did have much lower levels of government control in the
economy, as evidenced by all prices being free of control apart from key items including petroleum
products, cement, reinforcing bars, and wheat flour (Sacerdoti et al, 1994). This proves to be in
direct contrast with the higher levels of protection in Burkina Faso. Moreover, it became very clear
that the Togolese economy was very vulnerable in 1992 and 1993 given the large decline in
phosphate export volume in combination with an adverse terms of trade shock (Sacerdoti et al,
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1994). As prices fluctuate, incomes fall for the majority of the population which lives in rural areas
of Togo, tensions inevitably increased as a result of decreasing welfare and quality of life. Based on
this information, Togo seems to have suffered from too little economic protection in the global
economy which may have benefitted economic growth, but this proves to be unimportant in
preventing conflict recurrence and developing peace. This lack of protection policies may be
connected to colonial asymmetric intervention in Togo. By lowering the levels of protection in
Togo, neither the Kwa or the Gur people would have control over imports or exports. Therefore,
competition between ethnic groups as a result of colonial asymmetric intervention resulted in lower
levels of economic protection which have negatively impacted the stability of the Togolese economy
and in turn has increased the likelihood of continued conflict. Moreover, there is a very clear issue in
terms of the resource curse and heavy dependence on international markets for income. The heavy
reliance on phosphate in turn produces a serious vulnerability in the Togolese economy that was
only worsened by political and social unrest after the introduction of an increasingly democratic
government generated by the development of opposition parties in a high autocratic government
under Gnassingbé Edeyama.
In addition to the internal issues that have affected the Togolese economy after conflict,
there were also issues that arose because of the combination of Togo’s own economic and
governance issues and external intervention by the World Bank. Based on the information available
in the World Bank discussion paper Institutional development and Technical Assistance in
Macroeconomic Policy: A Case Study of Togo published in 1987, the Togolese economy suffered
from failure on behalf of both the Togolese government and the World Bank to find a way to make
technical assistance (TA) a successful program. This pre-conflict analysis of the successes and
shortcomings of technical assistance in Togo allows for a better understanding of the economic
conditions and inappropriate strategy on behalf of the World Bank to help the Togolese economy.
Additionally, this ineffective effort to aid the Togolese economy may have very well contributed to
the rise of conflict in 1988, considering that literature states that poor economic performance can
give rise to conflict. Given the degree of ethnic discrimination present in Togo since colonization,
the World Bank did consider this to be a sign to decrease operations in Togo and move instead to
areas where people were more willing to address ethnic discrimination for the sake of the poor
(Kjellstrom et al, 1987). This reasoning on behalf of the World Bank failed to take into account that
those who are poor and ethnically discriminated against would suffer even more without economic
intervention by the World Bank. To deprive those suffering due to poverty because of ethnic
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discrimination in a country would not improve the ethnic tensions in an area, but rather force the
poor to suffer even more when they could have been helped by World Bank intervention.
The economic issues started in the ‘70s in Togo due to the heavy reliance on phosphate
exports for state income and the failure to properly address problems that arose with the fluctuation
of phosphate prices on the global market. Togolese economic growth in 1974 was erratic due to
fluctuating prices of phosphate on the global market (Kjellstrom, 1987). As a response to
fluctuations in phosphate prices, the Togolese government widened the budget and the balance of
payment deficits in an attempt to capitalize on the phosphate boom, but this instead led to the crisis
of ‘79-’82 where the diagnosis was a cyclical rather than structural issue with the economy
(Kjellstrom, 1987). This meant that instead of addressing the budget and balance of payments
problems, the Togolese government instead focused on slowing investment which just resulted in
the stagnation of GDP from ‘79-’82 (Kjellstrom, 1987). Moreover, action by the government to
address the crisis was stalled by uncoordinated and weak institutions along with the fragmentation of
decision making which was limited to those at the political summit (Kjellstrom, 1987). The incorrect
diagnosis of the issue, as a cyclical rather than structural issue, shows poor decisions on behalf of the
Togolese economy to first rely so heavily on phosphates for income and to then fail to take the
necessary measures to address the resulting issue. The unorganized and hierarchical nature of
economic institutions and decision-making structures in Togo could very well be the result of
colonial policies: Togo developed as a state out of extractive colonial institutions with the added
element of competition and disorganization that came from asymmetric intervention on behalf of
both the German and French colonial administrations. As a result, Togo suffers from a serious
disadvantage when it comes to development and post conflict recovery: poor institutions combined
with ethnic tensions and power struggles as a result of colonialization.
As a result of this economic crisis in Togo, relations with the IMF were strained until 1983
when the Togolese government showed a “genuine willingness to fix the issue” (Kjellstrom 1987, 8).
IMF involvement consisted of programs focused on budget austerity, very tight monetary policy,
changes to public investment planning, and rehabilitation of state enterprises (Kjellstrom, 1987). The
IMF policies put into place were not focused on the incorrect diagnosis of the structural problems
that resulted in the ’79-’82 crisis, but rather on addressing the symptoms of that problem. This focus
was made very clear in the ‘83-’84 structural adjustment program which was intended to improve
public resource management while waiting for the economy to recover before working towards
restarting economic activity (Kjellstrom, 1987). As a result of this policy, livelihoods throughout
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Togo were seriously damaged during the crisis of ‘79-’82 and in its aftermath. The combination of
austerity measures, the halting of economic growth due to the misdiagnosis of the structural nature
of the phosphate boom, and IMF policies resulted in a very serious blow to living standards in Togo
and to Togolese livelihoods. This damage to Togolese livelihood very well could have contributed to
the rise of conflict in 1987 as it increased dissatisfaction with both the economy and how the
Togolese government was treating its citizens.
The World Bank’s technical assistance project had its own shortcomings that only magnified
the existing shortfalls of the very young Togolese government and institutions. The technical
assistants sent by the World Bank to Togo were heavily reliant on the Togolese government to
provide “a propitious work environment and qualified local staff with whom the technical assistance
can work” (Kjellstrom 1987, 19). This expectation proved to be rather backwards in a country like
Togo which had only gained independence just under thirty years earlier. Moreover, there was very
limited use of technical assistance to help train national civil service workers and those who did have
training lost their skills due to a lack of opportunities to apply their skills and gain practical
experience (Kjellstrom, 1987). This proved to be a major issue in the use of Technical Assistance in
Togo by the World Bank. Failure to train Togolese civil servants and loss of skills due to little to no
opportunities to gain practical experience had a negative impact on the work force and on
government institutions. A more effective approach to helping the Togolese economy would have
been to recognize the shortcomings of the existing institutions and work towards training civil
servants and giving them the opportunity to practice their skills, gain real experience, and work
towards improving their own institutions. To apply help that relies on strong institutions and good
governance to a state like Togo is akin to trying to build a house before putting down the
foundation; without a strong institutional base and civil servants who are well trained, effective and
have better quality output, the technical assistance from the World Bank failed to generate a positive
result.
In addition to being an ineffective strategy, the WB technical assistance program proved to
fuel conflict and issues of competition for more power within the government. There was evidence
found by the World Bank that some government ministers in Togo used technical assistance to
make themselves more powerful than other ministers (Kjellstrom, 1987). This reflects in part the
survival strategy of ethnic elites under French colonialism: to garner as much power as possible to
survive the political climate. This shows how colonial asymmetric intervention in Togo has had
impacts throughout independence by generating an unstable governing climate which is heavily
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affected by the interests of the powerful. Additionally, there were many cases where technical
assistance staffers were used to replace national staffers which left Togo with fewer well trained and
experienced staffers and a heavy reliance on external assistance (Kjellstrom, 1987). This use of TA
staffers in the place of Togolese staffers was also done in operational projects (Kjellstrom, 1987).
The replacement of national civil servants with TA staffers eliminated the learning opportunities for
civil servants in Togo which rendered the TA program ineffective. The swapping of national staffers
with technical assistance staffers was due to poor governance on behalf of the Togolese government
as well as poor management of the WB technical assistance project. By having TA staffers do the
work of national civil servants, the World Bank’s TA project only served to weaken the institutions
and the civil work force of Togo.
In addition to the replacement of national staffers by technical assistance staffers, there were
also clashes between the two groups. TA staffers were able to enjoy privileged access to ministers
while Togolese staffers did not, which meant that TAs often had more control over critical issues
than Togolese staffers (Kjellstrom, 1987). As a result, tensions between TA staffers and Togolese
staffers arose and IMF and WB efforts to help Togo develop were subverted as these replacements
meant there would be no actual improvement in local capabilities (Kjellstrom, 1987). In other words,
the relationships between TA staffers, Togolese Ministers, and Togolese staffers resulted in the
inefficient use of and poor results of the World Bank’s TA program. Moreover, these relationships
increased the dependence of Togo on external development aid. As a result, the combination of
poor governance and technical assistance staffers failing to train Togolese civil servants was
damaging rather than beneficial to the Togolese government and economy. Here it becomes clear
that the combination of World Bank efforts and the complications of Togolese governance as a
result of asymmetric intervention has had a clear negative impact on the development of Togo
economically as well as having a negative impact regarding the start and the continuation of conflict.
Moreover, the TA strategies proved to fall short in adapting to the internal politics within
the government of Togo. As roles changed in the Togolese government, the incoming member
could, and often would, scrap the plans of the previous member resulting in lower efficiency and
much slower results for government plans (Kjellstrom, 1987). With the turnover of political servants
in Togo and the scrapping of previous plans, the job of TA staffers was made more difficult as they
had to adjust to political shifts in addition to helping address economic issues. This frequent
ministerial turnout and the resulting frequent changes in government plans also reflects the impacts
of colonial asymmetric intervention. With the power imbalance between ethnic groups and the
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political advantage of the Kwa peoples, governance in Togo was forced into an unstable turbulent
position given the continuous battles over power. However, there are cases where turnover of
ministry leadership was beneficial in Togo; the appointment of a new Minister of State Enterprises
who was keen on seeking World Bank assistance for sweeping state reform helped to reinvigorate
the 1984 IDA-financed technical assistance program to promote state enterprise reform (Kjellstrom,
1987). What this shows is that international development aid must be conducted in a manner that is
conscientious of national challenges and changes during efforts to provide aid and develop strategies
to address these changes more effectively. Moreover, the World Bank writes that development
“requires long lasting institutions with well trained staff” who are capable of conducting the
development process “harmoniously and effectively” (Kjellstrom, 1987). Given the previous
description of the Togolese government and the institutions at hand, development is an incredibly
difficult to attain goal for Togo. Moreover, this Technical Assistance project actually prevented the
development of a well-trained staff. Instead of focusing on austerity measures and using technical
assistance staffers to replace national civil service staffers, the focus should be on how to improve
the institutions in place in Togo and how to help civil service employees be more effective and work
together. Moreover, an understanding of the institutions and power dynamics that are residual from
colonial times in countries where the World Bank is conducting projects would be beneficial to the
effectiveness of projects and in addressing the institutional causes of underdevelopment which also
contribute to conflict.
In comparison to Togo, Burkina Faso had a different relationship with international
development organizations but a similar economy. Burkina Faso’s economic history is based on a
World Bank Economic Memorandum published in 1989, just after the conflict of study. This is due
to the fact that Togo had massive World Bank and IMF involvement throughout the economy after
the Togolese coup in 1987, but Burkina Faso has had a different economic experience which can be
seen in the appendix showing tables regarding IMF and World Bank programming over the years in
both countries.
Burkina Faso’s economy at the time of the conflict can be broken down quite simply into
different sectors. The primary sector was made up of agriculture, stock raising, and forestry and
fisheries (Economic memorandum, 1989). The secondary sector was made up of mining,
manufacturing, electricity, gas, water, and construction (Economic memorandum, 1989). The
secondary sector itself was made up partially of modern and private enterprises (Economic
Memorandum, 1989). Within the secondary sector there were very low levels of employment
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especially in mining and industry (Economic Memorandum, 1989). These would seem to be some of
the best sources for increasing the income of the general population in Burkina Faso, but due to low
employment this possibility was not harnessed. Even given the growth rate of the gold mining sector
between 1982 and 1987 being estimated at 26% per year, limited employment prevented this growth
from being taken advantage of (Economic Memorandum, 1989). Another major source of income
for Burkina Faso was migrant labor and fund transfers from Burkinabe migrants into the Cote
D’Ivoire (Economic memorandum, 1989). In addition to the primary and secondary sectors of
Burkina Faso’s economy, there was also the informal sector, the Banking sector, and the parastatal
sector which represents both high levels of protectionism and government involvement in the
economy.
The informal sector has not expanded apart from gold panning between 1982-1987, the one
part of mining that has grown and been taken advantage of by the general population (Economic
Memorandum, 1989). The importance of informal mining is further analyzed in this thesis as a
major source of income and improved quality of life for the Burkinabe population which has been
key in the prevention of conflict recurrence. On the other hand, the Banking sector of Burkina Faso
was heavily laden with rules and regulations which limited opportunities for growth. These
limitations included a system of strict credit management, control of banking margins, so narrow to
the point that banks have been pushed away from taking necessary risks, and interest rates which
were kept too low to stimulate the mobilization of financial savings (Economic Memorandum,
1989). These tight measures of control in the banking sector were the result of both a high level of
government involvement in the sector, by the Ministry of Finance, and poor governance of finances
which has resulted in the dampening of growth opportunities in Burkina Faso. This key difference
of state control in economics between Togo and Burkina Faso could be connected to the effects
asymmetric intervention had in Togo and the lack of asymmetric intervention in Burkina Faso.
Burkina Faso, because of the lack ethnic tensions and competition arising from colonialism, may
have been able to maintain tighter control over sectors like the economy with higher levels of
protectionism and the large parastatal sector. Togo, on the other hand suffered serious ethnic
clashes due to colonial asymmetric intervention and this seems to be connected to the increased
privatization and the lack economic protections. This stark contrast in economic policies between
Toga and Burkina Faso suggests the reasoning could be connected back to the treatment of ethnic
groups under colonialism.
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As previously mentioned, Burkina Faso’s parastatal sector is analyzed here as a major sign of
government involvement in economics which can be a double-edged sword. The parastatal sector of
Burkina Faso was established at independence and expanded by following governments, proving to
be a key point of difference between Burkina Faso and Togo which opted instead for far less
government involvement in economics (Economic Memorandum, 1989). The parastatal sector
controlled virtually all public services in Burkina Faso, the banking system, and dominated the
modern industrial sector through its non-negligible role in the commercial sector (Economic
Memorandum, 1989). From 1982-1987 the civil service and parastatal salaries were dropping or
stagnant and the investment rate fell from 23% of GDP in 1982 to 19% in 1989 (Economic
Memorandum, 1989). Even with these dropping salaries, the parastatal sector was dominant in
controlling water, electricity, and mining with the exception of gold mining which was far more
powerful in the informal sector (Economic Memorandum, 1989). This dominance of the parastatal
sector shows the very powerful role the Burkina Faso government had in the state economy, which
is in stark contrast to Togo which made clear efforts between 1982 and 1991 to reduce the parastatal
sector.
The parastatal sector of Burkina Faso worked within a rigid legal framework created in 1984
where there were administrative agencies and the industrial and commercial agencies in addition to
the state-owned and mixed-capital enterprises which were governed, for the most part, by general
business regulations (Economic Memorandum, 1989). The ministry of Economic Promotion, the
Ministry of Finance, and other similar technical ministries such as commerce and transportation
appointed and supervised public enterprise managers (Economic Memorandum, 1989). Given this
vast level of supervision, there was still very little intervention on behalf of these various enterprises
(Economic Memorandum, 1989). This limited intervention on behalf of the supervisory ministries
means that the events taking place within the parastatal sector either were going according to the
government’s plans and wishes, or the supervisory institutions were ineffective in their work.
Considering the colonial history of Burkina Faso, especially as an extractive colony, ineffective
institutions make sense according to the literature on the impact of colonialism. Regardless, the
multitudes of ministries that supervised different enterprises in the parastatal sector of Burkina Faso
showed high levels of government guidance and involvement throughout the Burkinabe economy.
This is a striking difference to Togo where there was very little government involvement and a much
bigger focus on privatization. This multitude of ministries could very well be connected to Mossi
chiefs being granted their original governing privileges after independence. By regaining their
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original political power, Mossi chiefs may have institutionalized that power by creating these
different ministries in the economic sector which connects directly back to how ethnic groups in
Burkina Faso were treated differently from ethnic groups in Togo during colonization.
Throughout these economic sectors, there are major constraints that have impacted Burkina
Faso’s economic growth, stability, and development. These constraints were demographics,
environmental issues, and issues regarding human resource development (Economic Memorandum,
1989). Within agriculture, there was a heavy reliance on exports for the overall trade balance in
Burkina Faso, ranging between 57% and 87% from 1982 to 1989 (Economic Memorandum, 1989).
Moreover, the growth of the Burkinabe population posed another environmental threat as this
resulted in the increased exploitation of resources, especially fuel wood, which resulted in
deforestation, soil erosion, and loss of surface water (Economic Memorandum, 1989). The
overpopulated central plateau of Burkina Faso was one of the major victims of the environmental
pressures and disasters well known to the Sahel region: rapid growth of the rural population,
overexploitation of cultivable land, plant cover and water resources; a sharp decline in soil fertility;
and erosion and the threat of desertification (Economic Memorandum, 1989). This heavy reliance
on agriculture was dangerous, especially given Burkina Faso’s geographic location in the Sahel, a
notoriously vulnerable part of the world when it comes to environmental threats like climate change.
Given the expansive role of the government in the Burkinabe economy, and as in any
underdeveloped country working towards development, there were a great deal of efforts on behalf
of the government to make fixes in the economy. This is where the constraint of human resource
development becomes clear along with poor execution on behalf of improving public investment
planning. For most of Burkina Faso’s history, the population and training system was enrolling a
small fraction of the school age population while orienting the relatively larger percentage of
enrolled children into secondary and higher education (Economic Memorandum, 1989). This
strategy was an effort to generate a larger pool of civil servants but eventually fell out of line with the
needs of the economy (Economic Memorandum, 1989). The heavy focus on secondary and higher
education has developed into a time lagged result of poor governance, a concept which will be
addressed later on in this section. The World Bank recommended that the focus be shifted to
increasing primary school education and enrollment rates (Economic Memorandum, 1989). This is a
rational response as increased primary school rates of graduation will improve employment
prospects for the Burkinabe population and provide the basis for which a stronger pool of civil
servants can be created.
45

Finally, there was the issue of poor execution of public investment planning which can be
seen in the example of the Programme Populaire de Développement (PPD) which took place from
1984-1985 (Economic Memorandum, 1989). The PPD stressed food security, water supply, housing,
and basic social services with an emphasis on the following sectoral composition with the budget
allocation of CFAF 142.6 million: agriculture and stock raising (23% of the program), water supply
(19%), transportation (23%) and human resources (12%) (Economic Memorandum, 1989).
However, actual disbursement for the PPD barely went over CFAF 80 billion with the following
implementation rates: transportation (77%), agriculture and stock-raising (65%), human resources
sectors (65%), water supply sector (28%) and the projects of national priority (21%) (Economic
Memorandum, 1989). These variable and very low implementation rates of the different focus points
of the PPD while using only 56% of the total budget show poor investment management and poor
governance on behalf of the managers of the PPD. While there was a clear focus on improving
human resources, the overall project failed to have a substantial impact due to the poor use of the
budget and the failure to follow the initial plan for the PPD. This proves to be a case of poor
management of funds and investment by the Burkina Faso government. This case shows how
government involvement in the economy can have a negative impact as much as it can have a
positive impact, especially in the delicate realm of development.
Outside of government efforts to fix issues within the Burkinabe economy, there were also
very serious issues regarding debt. From the start of the 1970s, Burkina Faso had negligible debt
obligations that began to rise to 6% of revenue by 1975, 9% by 1980, and almost 20% by 1987
(Economic Memorandum, 1989). Overall capital spending by the government ranged between 10%
and 20% of total expenditure between 1975 and 1987 and as more resources were channeled into
debt amortization investment spending fell from 17% of total expenditure in the late 1970s to 5% in
1986 (Economic Memorandum, 1989). This shows a very heavy responsibility on behalf of the
government to maintain a handle on debts, even in a poor and underdeveloped country like Burkina
Faso. Moreover, the timing of this shift in debt financing and government spending lines up almost
perfectly with the timing of the conflict of study. This reflects, once again, the literature on conflicts
that focuses on the importance of economic performance. By cutting into spending to address
debts, Burkina Faso was forced to limit growth and opportunities for human development. In
comparison to Togo, Burkina Faso managed to get a handle on their debts sooner, but this may be
due in part to the different measurements used; Togo’s debt is measured as a percentage of GDP
and Burkina Faso’s debt is measured as a percentage of total revenues. Given these different
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measures and the lack of available data to draw a better comparison here, all that can be known for
sure is that the timelines of debt amortization were different but still successful, until 1988 in
Burkina Faso after the coup of study.
By the end of 1987 though, the downward trend in investment spending was reversed and
deficit financing reached the central bank ceiling (Economic Memorandum, 1989). During this
period of increasing the funds allocated to relieving debts there was also a substantial trade deficit
from 1983-1987 where major exports of goods like cotton, livestock, and gold (largely outside
official channels) covered only 45% of the cost of goods and services being imported at the same
time (Economic Memorandum, 1989). However, even with this large trade deficit Burkina Faso
remained one of the few countries in the UMOA and the BEAC zones to have a positive and
substantial balance in the operations account with the French Treasury (Economic Memorandum,
1989). This was likely because of remittances from Burkinabe workers abroad, large surpluses on
factor services from public and private transfers at the time, and significant net capital inflows of
which 54% of which went to grants for project financing, 38% of which went to net disbursements
on foreign loans, and 8% went to private direct investment all combined to result in a balance of
payments surplus through the ‘80s, except for 1982 and 1985 (Economic Memorandum, 1989).
Burkina Faso seemed to have been able to maintain a better handle on its debts than Togo did, even
with a large trade deficit.
However, even with this impressive performance regarding debt payments, Burkina Faso did
start to face issues with the public finance system after the 1988 overthrow of Thomas Sankara by
Blaise Compaoré. The budgetary situation in Burkina Faso began to rapidly decline based on the
available data from 1988 on preliminary debt services (Economic Memorandum, 1989). The public
finance system began to deteriorate even while the economy was performing so well (Economic
Memorandum, 1989). The World Bank Economic Memorandum from 1989 did not have the final
balance of the treasury accounts, but the preliminary data showed a number of slippages on the
recurrent expenditure side especially in extra-budgetary accounts (Economic Memorandum, 1989).
These slippages seem to have been the source of the increasing amounts overdue as they caused
bigger issues with cash-flow problems (Economic Memorandum, 1989). Burkina Faso overall
seemed to have a good handle on its debts until 1988 when the public finance system began to
deteriorate, and arrears climbed to between CFAF 25 and 30 million by the end of 1988 (Economic
Memorandum, 1989). The reason for these slips was not clear but considering that the timing was
just after another military coup that put Blaise Compaoré in power and the source of the slips seem
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to be issues with recurring expenditures on extra-budgetary accounts, corruption does not seem to
be out of the question. Moreover, this connects back to the literature as conflict in this case does
beget more economic difficulties.
Given the successful history of dealing with debt in Burkina Faso, there are still issues
present in governing the economy that need to be addressed in this analysis. First, even though the
government is highly involved in the economy, there are issues of information and decentralized
decision making especially in the public and parastatal sectors (Economic Memorandum, 1989). Due
to these information issues the government tended to focus its action on “major but partial
elements” of public sector management (Economic Memorandum, 1989). This, in effect, was poor
governance in the public sector which, as the qualitative analysis provided here suggest, may very
well have been connected to the lack of asymmetric intervention during colonialism and the clear
ethnic majority held by the Mossi empire. Moreover, given the dispersed nature of data on
borrowing arrangements and the previously mentioned decentralized decision making, this has
resulted in grave mistakes in the forecasting of debt service commitments and poor management of
public debt (Economic Memorandum, 1989). This proves to be a clear case where poor institutions
and data result in poor governance; without effective institutions and good data collection
governance proves to be a more difficult task than it already is.
Moreover, poor institutions are only weakened by how numerous they are, and this was
clearly the case in Burkina Faso. There were numerous different agricultural and rural sector
institutions in Burkina Faso which has resulted in cumbersome and innumerable fiscal, price, and
trade regulations (Economic Memorandum, 1989). In combination with the numerous institutions,
and possibly even a result of these institutions, there were poor decisions regarding aid. Specifically,
after the drought in 1986 food aid was continued even though there was a domestic cereal surplus
(Economic Memorandum, 1989) This resulted in the collapse of local market prices and serves as an
example of aid being more harmful than it is beneficial (Economic Memorandum, 1989). In addition
to this, there were serious limitations to the industrial development of the domestic market
(Economic Memorandum, 1989). Low per capita income, the limited development of urban centers,
and the dispersal of the population have each served as barriers to industrial development due to the
resulting higher distribution costs (Economic Memorandum, 1989). Here, poverty has sown more
poverty as efforts to improve the domestic market and provide better services were thwarted by the
inability to cover distribution costs, cumbersome institutions and regulation, and poorly directed aid.
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In addition to poor institutions and ineffective aid, there was also the issue of protection. As
previously mentioned, economic protection can serve as a double-edged sword, and Burkina Faso
shows just that. As a landlocked country, transportation costs are higher in Burkina Faso, and these
higher costs were combined with numerous measures for protection. (Economic Memorandum,
1989; Wilkins, 1989). The efforts to protect the Burkinabe economy developed overtime into
inefficient protection combined with poor institutions which resulted in the unnecessary
complication of the duties of customs officers (Economic Memorandum, 1989). As a result of this
complication of custom officer tasks, fraud became prevalent, there were poor investment
incentives, and people became so used to the protection that they struggled whenever it was phased
out (Economic Memorandum, 1989). Moreover, the investment incentives that were present came
in the form of very costly benefits to the state, such as protracted tax exemptions, and to the
economy, such as excessive customs protection (Economic Memorandum, 1989). Here,
protectionism in an effort to entice investment only served to damage the state and the economy
itself.
Finally, there is the issue of education in Burkina Faso. As previously mentioned, education
in Burkina Faso was too heavily focused on secondary and higher education. The cost of education,
apart from primary education, was relatively high in Burkina Faso since teacher salaries were not low
and there were organizational issues that have resulted in lower teacher utilization rates (Economic
Memorandum, 1989). Moreover, one third of the budget for education was allocated to scholarships
for secondary and higher education (Economic Memorandum, 1989). On top of this ineffective use
of funds and poor organization within the education sector, the education sector’s external
efficiency remained low as the training in skills and technologies did not have a clear link to the
corresponding needs of the economy (Economic Memorandum, 1989). This means, that even with
higher education rates in secondary and higher education statistics, Burkina Faso did not successfully
provide a workforce that could have been used to improve not only economic growth, but also the
wellbeing and quality of life of citizens. Given these characteristics, there was an increasing risk of
underemployment as the education system produced more graduates than there are mid-level
professional jobs, and the number of university graduates exceeded the demand for senior-level
professions in Burkina Faso (Economic Memorandum, 1989). Finally, out of the secondary and
higher education students, 62% of those enrolled are in literary disciplines (Economic
Memorandum, 1989). This all means that there was a huge disconnect between the education sector
and the economy which resulted in the needs of the Burkinabe economy not being met and the
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educated population of Burkina Faso failing to find sources of income that match their credentials.
As a general critique, this case goes to show that education cannot be studied outside of
employment opportunities when focusing on economic and human development. There is human
development with education but there needs to be some kind of balance between graduate rates and
job creation otherwise there will be serious unemployment issues which can fuel conflict.
Finally, looking at the history of World Bank projects for both Burkina Faso and Togo (see
table 1), it becomes clear that the relationships between the IMF and World Bank with Togo and
Burkina Faso were very different, which could have contributed to the different outcomes after each
respective conflict. It is interesting to see that there have been more structural adjustment projects
and technical assistance projects in Togo than there have been in Burkina Faso, Togo with four
structural adjustment projects between 1980 and 1995 while Burkina Faso has had only one
structural adjustment project. This could be part of the issue with Togo’s slow economic recovery
post conflict, though there is undoubtedly an effect due to continued socio-political tensions.
However, looking at the rates of GDP growth per capita and GDP per capita, it seems that these
structural adjustment and technical assistance programs might have been helpful with economic
growth in Togo after 1994 (see table 4 and table 5). What is important to recognize here is that while
Togo’s economy is larger than Burkina Faso’s, this has essentially nothing to do with whether
conflict ended or continued. In this comparative case study analysis, the size of the economy does
not prevent conflict or conflict recurrence. There are also many other projects that focused on
reorganizing or addressing issues with investment in Togo which could have also had lasting impacts
on economic recovery after conflict. This is however affected by the implications of continuing
political and social unrest after the introduction of opposition parties in 1991. There could be a
potential issue with introducing structural adjustment programs and investment changes during
social and political unrest. This may be an example of the importance to call for political and social
stability before changing investment structures and introducing structural adjustment projects.
Moreover, structural adjustment projects, based on the evidence given in the case study from earlier,
do not seem to help with human development of the population especially in improving the quality
of life and wellbeing of the Togolese population. This could be key in understanding Togo’s
economic growth in conjunction with continued conflict. The economy may have been growing in
Togo a few years after the conflict, but due to the organization of the economy human development
was likely lower. This in combination with the oppression of different ethnic groups and the poor
implementation of democracy in 1991 has likely contributed to the continued conflict in Togo.
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Moreover, Burkina Faso’s relationship with the World Bank as evidenced by the list of projects
present in Table 1 have been mostly focused on improving infrastructure, addressing environmental
concerns, and focusing on urban and rural development. Given the limited scope of this thesis, each
project cannot be analyzed here. However, to conduct an analysis of different World Bank projects
in Burkina Faso and Togo as well as around the world can be beneficial. A historical study like that
can help in addressing how to improve relationships between developing countries and development
organizations by looking at what has worked and what hasn’t given the different economic and
political atmospheres that are involved in World Bank projects.
This analysis of the economies of Burkina Faso and Togo around the time of each conflict
highlights several key points and avenues of improvement. First, protectionism in developing
countries proves to be a double-edged sword. Protectionism in Burkina Faso helped in creating a
less vulnerable economy, outside of environmental factors, but also suffocated opportunities for
economic growth. Togo, on the other hand, lacked protectionism and therefore suffered the
consequences of economic vulnerability and volatility due to the heavy dependence on global
markets. In addition to the issue of balancing the right amount of protectionism for each economy,
there is also the problem of poor governance and institutions. Colonial institutions are present in
both countries and had a lasting impact on how each country developed economically as well as how
each economy is governed. Finally, there is also the topic related to international interventions and
external efforts to improve the economic development of each country. Much like protectionism,
economic development projects by the IMF and the World Bank can be helpful and harmful. The
key is international institutions being able to adjust to changes in economics as well as changes in
political and social atmospheres. Without awareness of political and social tensions, economic
interventions will not live up to expectations of success and instead may hurt the economy, much
like technical assistance in Togo did in the early 1980s.

Section 5b: Mining in Togo and Burkina Faso
The focus on mining here is to provide a look into how economic policies in both Burkina
Faso and Togo have contributed to conflict or conflict recovery. Moreover, both countries are
natural resource rich which raises the risk of the resource curse which contributes to lower levels of
economic development and conflict recurrence. Artisanal mining, however, proves to be key in
contributing to human development in Burkina Faso, but not in Togo due to regulations and mining
law.
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Within the Togolese economy, mining, especially of phosphates, played an important role in
both growth and instability. From ‘89-’93 mining was stagnant in Togo and economic growth
remained at 0.1% (Sacerdoti et al, 1994). Mining had plunged in 1990 due to the loss of phosphate
export markets in Europe which had banned Togolese phosphate due to the high cadmium content
and in Asia and Latin America due to changes in ownership of customer’s enterprises (Sacerdoti et
al, 1994). Mining conditions worsened in 1992 as there were severe disruptions in production which
led to export volumes to fall to 2.1 million metric tons in 1992 and 1.6 million metric tons in 1993
(Sacerdoti et al, 1994). The reason behind the disrupted production remains unclear but is likely due
to political turmoil that had set off the general strike in 1992 which had seriously cut down on the
number of available employees and laborers (Sacerdoti et al, 1994). These issues seriously affected
the Togolese economy during and after the conflict of study. It is likely that they have contributed to
how conflict in the country had continued after the 1988 coup.
Togo’s mining institutions were far more disorganized than in Burkina Faso resulting in an
even deeper entrenchment in the resource curse and a lower level of economic development. First, it
is important to recognize that mining in Togo was done entirely by companies, either government or
foreign owned (Togo First Phase of Mining, 2015). This may connect back to colonial asymmetric
intervention. By privatizing natural resource extraction, neither of the clashing ethnic groups, the
Ewe or the Kabye, could maintain complete control over natural resource revenues and instead left
that to outside groups. The five major mining companies in Togo were SCANTOGO owned by
Heidelberg Cement in Germany which extracted about 1,500,000 metric tons of clinker, WACEM a
west African cement company that extracted 400,000 metric tons of cement and 1,200,000 metric
tons of clinker, MM Mining an Australian owned company with majority equity owners “Togolese
Private Interests” that extracted 85,000 metric tons of iron ore, SNPT is the Togolese mining
company which had the exclusive rights to phosphate extraction at about 2,00,000 metric tons a
year, and finally there was POMAR which extracted an unknown amount of marble and was owned
by Groupe Dennis which, due to a lack of publicly available information, seems to be a shell
company hinting at corruption (Togo First Phase of Mining, 2015; Perez, 2019b). What is important
to note here is that every one of the previously mentioned companies was owned entirely by their
parent company which are essentially foreign interests extracting mineral from Togolese soil (Perez,
2019b). This is in stark contrast to Burkina Faso which had 10% equity ownership for every gold
extracting mine on their soil. As a result, even though Togo has a monopoly over phosphate
extraction, Togo limited its revenues from extractive industries. Additionally, the ambiguity of
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“Togolese Private Interests” and around Groupe Dennis generated a lack of transparency around
who is really getting the revenues from extractive industries. This lack of transparency around
mining revenues and the high level of mineral extraction contributed to the resource curse as the
lack of transparency prevented accountability for where mining revenues went and how they were
spent. In addition, this lack of transparency increased the risk for foreign investors which prevented
economic growth in Togo from the natural resource wealth. Moreover, it was undoubtedly
frustrating for Togolese citizens whose lives were affected by resource extraction, whether it be
through pollution or displacement for the development of a new mine, to not know where the
profits are going and to not receive any direct benefits from resources being extracted from their
own land.
In addition to the different companies that extracted resources and their characteristics,
there are the characteristics of the mining sector itself in Togo that potentially contributed to the
resource curse and lower opportunities for human development. First, there were multiple different
minerals that were being mined which inevitably added to the difficulties of good governance as
previously mentioned. In addition, the institutions in Togo’s mining sector suffered from
disorganization, overlap, and poor legal management. Both the MME and SNPT lacked the skills to
properly monitor the mining activities taking place in Togo and staff in the National Environmental
Regulation Agency (ANGE) had limited knowledge about the environmental and social
management of extractive industry operations (Togo First Phase of Mining, 2015). Moreover,
according to a World Bank Report on a proposed mining and governance project there was overall
poor governance of extractive industries in Togo, sector institutions faced overlapping and unclear
roles and inadequate capacities to address issues in mining and in revenue collection in Togo, the
SNPT itself faced poor corporate accountability, and a serious lack of reporting of reliable data on
mineral production and revenues generated by the extractive industries sector (Togo First Phase of
Mining, 2015). These overlapping and often confusing roles by departments in the mining sector
contributed to ineffective and overall poor governance of mining in Togo which contributes to the
resource curse and the resulting tensions between the population and the government, especially of
those who were directly and negatively impacted by mineral extraction and extraction policies.
In addition to these institutional problems, there were legal and regulatory issues that
contribute to the resource curse and stagnation in foreign investment. There was incongruence
between the mining code and the state’s constitution, a lack of harmonization with other legislative
pieces like Land Law, Finance Law, and Framework Law on the Environment, and finally the
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Togolese mining code clashed with other mining laws and mining organizations in the sub-Saharan
region (Togo First Phase of Mining, 2015). In addition, the legal framework of mining in Togo had
qualities that made foreign investment and research unappealing due to a lack of permit holder’s
security (World Bank, 2019). Additionally, the lack of clear requirements for award or rejection of
mineral permit applications increased the likelihood that foreign investors would not become
involved due to fear of their investments being lost or unrecoverable (World Bank, 2019). Finally,
government approval process delayed or blocked further development and production which
created another disincentive for further research and investment into the Togolese mining industry
(World Bank, 2019). These legal and regulatory issues present in the Togolese mining sector
prohibited both more effective economic development and more effective governance, both of
which served as a source of and an exacerbating factor of the resource curse. Moreover, Togolese
policy regarding artisanal mining, which proves to be very beneficial for human development in
Burkina Faso, was limited to the extent that the Togolese population has almost no clear
opportunities to benefit from resource extraction and improve their quality of life and wellbeing.
Togolese mining policy prohibited artisanal mining unless there has been explicit
authorization by the Minister of Mines, something that is very difficult to achieve especially given
the administrative issues present within the mining sector as previously mentioned (Loi No 96-004,
1996). This means that artisanal mining was virtually impossible to do legally in Togo unless rural
communities by luck could work under a company in their local area where gold and diamonds were
being extracted. This severely limited the ability of Togolese artisanal miners to generate a profit off
artisanal gold and diamond mining. Moreover, by making artisanal mining unavailable, a large
number of people have been cut off from potential natural resource profits. This may be a result of
colonial asymmetric intervention as this mining policy eliminates profits that cannot be collected by
one specific group. This issue merits further study to be considered conclusive. Due to phosphate,
limestone, iron, and clinker being the major minerals extracted from Togo which were heavily reliant
on industry for circulation, there were limited opportunities for artisanal mining in these sectors.
Moreover, mining laws in Togo denied rural communities the opportunity to exploit natural
resource deposits in their area. This means that mining in Togo was governed in a way that makes
even readily exploitable minerals like gold and diamonds virtually impossible to attain via artisanal
mining. By reducing the ability for citizens to legally conduct artisanal mining projects, Togo cut off
the opportunity for citizens to improve their wellbeing and quality of life through natural resource
extraction.
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Burkina Faso’s mining policies and natural resources, however, tell a very different story
from that of Togo. Burkina Faso’s institutional structure did allow for individual citizens to benefit
directly from gold mining, but there were still issues with governance. There were three major
phases of mining governance in Burkina Faso: first was from 1986 when the parastatal Burkinabe
Precious Metals Counter (CBMP) was created and from 1995-96 when the state declared a “Decade
for mining Development” and published a “Declaration for Mining Policy” (Werthmann, 2017).
Then there was the second stage which consisted of the liberalization and privatization of gold
mining from 1996 to 2006 when the CBMP collapsed, and the final stage from 2006 to 2016 when
the new transitional government of Burkina Faso created a new mining code and a parliamentary
commission that conducted an inquiry into the mining sector (Werthmann, 2017). With the
privatization of the gold mining sector in the mid-1990s private gold buying companies were able to
profit quite a bit, especially if they were well-connected with the Compaoré government, which
resulted in some Burkinabe businessmen making their own laws in their mining areas, smuggling
gold out of the country, and provoking conflicts with gold miners and the local populations
(Werthmann, 2017).
Additionally, in the mid-1992 there was a great deal of structural reforms and opening of the
economy to increase FDI flows which benefiting mining companies by creating employment, taxrevenues for the state, and higher exports (Investment Policy Review, 2009). This inflow of foreign
investors and mining companies resulted in eight different major companies mining in Burkina Faso,
all of which were 10% owned by the government (Perez, 2019a). Avocet mining, a West African
gold mining and exploration company had an annual capacity of 5,200 kilograms of gold, Endeavour
Mining Crop was also West African and extracted 3,000 kilograms of gold per year, IAMGOLD
Corp was a Canadian owned company that extracted 12,000 kilograms of gold per year, Kalsaka
Mining S.A. owned by Amara Mining in London extracted 2,300 kilograms of gold a year, Semafo
Burkina Faso s.a. which was headquartered in Canada and extracted 9,300 kilograms of gold per
year, Société des Mines de Taparko s.a was owned by Nord Gold which is a Russian low-cost gold
producer and extracted 4,100 kilograms of gold per year, Bissa Gold was also owned by Nord Gold
and extracted 8,000 kilograms of gold per year, and finally there was the Perkoa Group owned by
the Swiss Glencore plc which extracted 1,100 kilograms of gold per year (Perez, 2019a). What is
important to recognize is that the government of Burkina Faso had 10% of the major equity with
each of these companies meaning that the government did get revenues from foreign mining
companies working in Burkina Faso. This means that even though a great deal of profits from
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extractive industries went to foreign companies, Burkina Faso still generated revenues from foreign
mining companies working on Burkina Faso land. These revenues then went to the government, but
since there is no way to follow the money, it remains unclear if these mining revenues are brought
back into the Burkinabe economy or not. This is in direct contrast with Togo where there are no
direct government revenues from mining outside of phosphates. This contrast in government
control of natural resource extraction and revenues may very well be connected to the colonial
asymmetric intervention in Togo which could be connected to the higher levels of privatization and
lower levels of government control. The reasoning behind this comes from the competition between
the Ewe and the Kabye that was generated during colonial asymmetric intervention which may have
impacted governance given this ethnic based political power competition. This could help to explain
the limited government control and the increasing levels of privatization, if one ethnic group cannot
control these resources, then it would make sense to instead give control to outside groups and
corporations. Burkina Faso on the other hand does not have any major ethnic cleavages and given
the extensive history of the Mossi being in control, it makes sense that they would maintain their
control through higher levels of protection and government involvement in the economy. Another
major problem in Burkina Faso is that there were still issues in converting exploration projects into
exploitation projects as a result in the failure of attracting companies with enough resources to build
the mines that want to exploit (Luning, 2012). Even with increases in FDI, money made from gold
mining mostly stayed in the hands of foreign companies and exploration projects failed to generate
promise of additional income from mining.
Another key difference in the mining policies in Togo and Burkina Faso are that Burkina
Faso’s mining policy allowed for citizens, whether they were miners or subsistence farmers looking
to boost their income, to improve their wellbeing and wealth which helped to mitigate some of the
tensions created by the resource curse. This artisanal mining policy could be a result of the lack of
asymmetric intervention in Burkina Faso during colonialism. Without clear ethnic cleavages, like
those generated by asymmetric intervention in Togo, there is not as much conflict over natural
resources which would mean there was no need to cut off mining privileges from specific groups.
Artisanal mining in Burkina Faso was pursued by two main groups: floating populations who
migrated to where there were gold deposits and members of rural communities who lived near
mining sites (Werthmann, 2017). Artisanal mining itself provided an alternative to other kinds of
informal occupations and to labor migration (Werthmann, 2013). By providing other avenues from
income, Burkinabe citizens were allowed other avenues outside of the major sectors like subsistence
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agriculture and the urban informal sector to make income and to support themselves which is key in
human development (Werthmann, 2013). As a result of the effects of droughts on subsistence
farming and the availability of gold deposits, artisanal mining became a principal economic activity
whether it be seasonal or migrant labor (Pokorny et al, 2019). Additionally, artisanal gold mining had
a different effect from industrial gold mining in that it did generate job opportunities and cash
income for local households whereas industrial mining largely failed to do so (Pokorny et al, 2019).
This allowed artisanal mining to be an incubator for local economic development and human
development (Pokorny et al, 2019). Artisanal mining functioned in tandem with industrial mining in
Burkina Faso as the presence of artisanal miners was taken as a sign of good gold deposits and
artisanal miners were then allowed to work under the regulation of a Burkinabe mining company
(Luning, 2008). As such, artisanal gold mining provided better incomes for local populations which
allowed people to afford better food and healthcare, generating better human development. These
benefits of artisanal mining were exploitable for two reasons. First, mining governance in Burkina
Faso allowed for local communities to take part in artisanal mining in the margins of industrial
mines and to sell the gold they find to companies. Second, since gold does not need to be processed
like other minerals to be useful it was a readily exploitable resource as it allowed for artisanal gold
miners to generate direct profits. This means that governance and the exploitable qualities of
minerals like gold go hand in hand in combatting tensions generated by the resource curse. This is
not to say that artisanal gold mining is the solution to the resource curse in Burkina Faso, but rather
that it helped to mitigate worsening human development which leads to helps in conflict prevention.

Conclusion
This thesis has focused on post-conflict recovery and conflict recurrence by comparing two
similar cases: Burkina Faso and Togo. The selection of these cases was based on the most similar
cases ideology since both Burkina Faso and Togo were under French colonial control and influence,
both gained independence in the 1960s, and both experienced multiple military coups. Moreover,
both Togo and Burkina Faso are located in West Africa, with Burkina Faso just north of Togo in the
Sahel region. This means that both countries have similar colonial and institutional backgrounds and
face somewhat similar environmental concerns. However, in the analysis of colonial histories, it
became clear that colonialism was not actually an area of similarity between Togo and Burkina Faso.
Instead, the colonial history of each country has proven to be a major explanatory variable,
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especially when considering the asymmetric intervention in Togo and the lack thereof in Burkina
Faso.
Based on these similarities, it has been made clear that colonial histories, especially the legacy
of colonial institutions that have existed into present day, serve as a major handicap in progressing
towards political stability and economic development in both Togo and Burkina Faso. Ethnic
clashes and inequalities are also based in colonial history, as evidenced in the analysis conducted
here, and are the result of statehood being forced upon entirely different and essentially
incompatible styles of governance within the geographic territories of both Burkina Faso and Togo.
In Togo, clear ethnic discrimination, a result of colonial asymmetric intervention, after the conflict
resulted in conflict recurrence while in Burkina Faso the lack of clear ethnic tensions contributed to
peace after the conflict of study. Furthermore, the extractive institutions created during French
colonialism have endured in both Togo and Burkina Faso, as have the survival strategies used under
colonialism. This has had a massive effect on how the Togolese and Burkinabe governments and
economies function which has played a key role in both conflicts.
Outside of colonial histories, it is also very clear that different approaches to economics have
impacted both countries in similar ways. Burkina Faso, on the one hand, had economic protection
that prevented serious instability and volatility but also made economic growth incredibly difficult.
Togo, on the other hand, lacked economic protection which was damaging as it resulted in a highly
vulnerable and volatile economy. Additionally, the natural resources in each country have proven to
contribute to the issue of the resource curse which has been part of the issue with the low levels of
economic development in each country. The natural resource extraction policies and approaches
differ in each country and have had different effects specifically on human development. In Burkina
Faso, artisanal gold mining has created a route for Burkinabe people to increase their incomes and
generate a higher quality of life and improved welfare. Moreover, the government of Burkina Faso
maintained a hold in all mining projects by owning 10% of all projects. Togo, in contrast, severely
restricted artisanal mining and did not have any direct ownership of any mining projects, apart from
phosphate mining which the state had a monopoly on, which instead are controlled entirely by
outside companies.
Finally, this thesis confronts the policies and projects of the World Bank. The case study in
Togo provides an in depth look at the disconnect between the World Bank and the Togolese
government. As a result of this disconnect, technical assistance was not beneficial in this case and
instead made conditions in the Togolese administration worse and developed a higher dependence
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on the presence of technical assistance staffers. Burkina Faso’s relationship with the World bank is
different as evidenced by the projects that have taken place, which instead of focusing on structural
adjustments and technical assistance have been more focused on agricultural infrastructure, urban
development, and education. Clearly, relationships with international development organizations
have the potential to be helpful and harmful. The issue is finding out how to provide help and
mitigate the potential harms that can be introduced through IMF and World Bank programming.
This thesis, partially due to a lack of readily available data, has focused on telling the story of
two very similar countries that have had very different outcomes from military coups in the late
1980s. The research here is limited to the information made available by other researchers.
Moreover, gaps in data from the IMF and World Bank have limited opportunities to parse apart
differences in how Burkina Faso and Togo addressed their debts. Furthermore, given the serious
lack of data on human development, and the resulting lack of information on the HDI of each
country over time, this research depends on making the connection between opportunities for and
evidence of improved human development. This issue can only be resolved through better and more
inclusive data collection for future studies. Finally, it is important to recognize a key strength of this
paper is in the in-depth case studies. Should this have been a quantitative analysis, the key variable of
different colonial experiences would have been ignored because both Togo and Burkina Faso were
French colonies. However, by looking at what at first glance was a similar colonial background for
each case, as French colonies, it became clear that the in-depth research into the colonial history of
each case proves that this most similar factor is in actuality a key difference. Without these in-depth
case study of the colonial histories in Togo and Burkina Faso, this key explanatory variable of the
different treatment of ethnic groups would not have been clear making it harder to understand why
Togo’s conflict continues while Burkina Faso’s conflict ended in peace.
A human development perspective is key in how this analysis adds to the existing knowledge
of post conflict recovery, development aid, and conflict recurrence. Moreover, by sourcing the start
of each conflict to the colonial histories of each state, the importance of institutions has been
brought to the forefront. This work does leave some unresolved problems and questions which can
be the subject of further research, both political and policy based. These questions and topics of
further research are as follows: How can IMF and World Bank projects and policies be modified or
improved to create avenues for better development that helps human development and not just
economic growth? What are potential strategies for addressing poor institutions that have been in
place in sub-Saharan countries since colonialism? How can colonial institutions in post59

independence societies be addressed to improve institutional, social, political, and economic
stability? What are the theories surrounding addressing post-colonial institutional legacies? How can
current tools for development employed by the IMF and the World Bank be improved to generate
resulted in both economic growth and in human development? The purpose of this thesis is
intended to highlight the importance of human development, colonial histories, and international
development projects in economic development, conflict recovery, and the prevention of conflict
recurrence. In addition, this thesis provides a critique of international development efforts by
through the case study of Togo and in the analysis of the different World Bank projects that have
taken place in both countries and have contributed to different conflict outcomes. Human
development is neglected in economic development, political science, and conflict studies and this
thesis highlights and points towards increasing the study of human development in order to improve
policies in economic development and in conflict prevention and recovery.
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Appendix 1
TABLES:
Table 1: World Bank Publications and Projects
Burkina

Project

Togo

Faso

Project

(Year)

(Year)
1980

-

West African Drought relief

-

Forestry project ($14 million)

(construction of two teacher

-

Niena Donkele rice program

training colleges, strengthening

(6 million five hundred

of directorate of education

thousand)

research and teacher training in

Involvement of women in

ministry of education which is

three bank projects

in charge of primary and

-

Drought relief fund project

secondary school curricula;

-

Second Bougouriba

expansion of national institute

agricultural project ($16

of agricultural training to train

million)

mid through high level staff

-

1980

-

First education project

and agricultural teachers for
primary and secondary schools
$11 million)
1981

-

Fourth highway project

-

Cotton road project

1981

-

Fourth highway project

-

Phosphate engineering and
technical assistance project
agreement

-

Agricultural pricing in Togo

-

Power and engineering and
technical assistance project
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1982

-

Third rural development

1982

-

Country economic

fund project

memorandum basic needs and

-

Education project

human resources and recent

-

3rd telecommunications

economic developments and

project

economic outlook

-

Expansion of rural

-

development project with 23
-

project

million 80 thousand $

-

Second highway project

Volta noir agricultural

-

Second rural development

development project
-

Second technical assistance

project in rural areas

Houts-bassins agricultural
development project

-

Koudougou pilot agricultural
project

1983

-

Agricultural issues study

-

Third highway project

-

Second telecommunications

CIMAO restructuring project

project

(clinker production and

Second rural development

railways)

-

-

-

-

1983

-

Togo, Ivory Coast, Ghana

fund project

-

Lomé water supply project

Performance audit of

-

Structural Adjustment project

Bougouriba agricultural

(to strengthen the balance of

development project

payments and restructure the

Cost financing of education

economy in a more productive

in Upper Volta: current

direction with higher growth

situation and prospects

through: accelerated rural

Country economic

development largely food

memorandum in human

crops for consumption and

resources

export, rehabilitate state

Perkoa mining exploration

enterprises in association with
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-

and technical assistance

the private sector, exploitation

project

of comparative advantage in

West Volta agricultural

mining by processing

development project

phosphate rock into

Upper Volta rural roads

phosphoric acid, promotion of

project

industrial development
through private investment in
small and medium scale light
manufacturing, improvements
in public investment planning
and execution)
-

Cocoa and coffee development
project

-

Togo to use IDA credit for
structural adjustment program

1985

-

Burkina Faso fertilizer

1984

-

project
-

-

Third highway project
(completion report)

Primary education

-

Maritime region rural

development project

development project and rural

(financial strategy to

development project in rural

accelerate the expansion of

areas (poor results due to

primary education)

weather and failure to adopt

Health services development

proposed technical packages.

project

Both show difficulties with
institution building and
effecting counterpart training)

1986

-

Issues and options in the

1985

-

Educational improvement

energy sector

project (improve the quality of

Technical assistance project

education in primary and

(fuelwood and deforestation)

secondary schools and
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improve educational
management)
-

Third technical assistance
project (to help implement and
consolidate the second phase
of the second structural
adjustment project)

-

Second structural adjustment
project (reverse economic
decline and lay the foundation
for sustainable growth over the
midterm and continue to
improve the balance of
payments and public finance
position)

-

Issues and options in the
energy sector (reliance on
imported petroleum products
and imported energy)

1987

-

-

Livestock development

1986

-

Institutional development and

project

technical assistance in

Artisan and small and

macroeconomic policy

medium scale enterprise

formulation: a case study of

project

Togo

Upper volta urban
development project

-

Wood recovery in the
Nangbeto lake region (removal
of 2,500 cubic meters of fuel
wood to build a hydro plant on
the Mono River the
conclusions and
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recommendations on technical
considerations, wood recovery
methods, and clearing costs)
-

Third coffee and cocoa
development project

1988

-

Agricultural research project

-

Cotton development

international finance

programs in Burkina Faso,

corporation project in Togo:

Ivory Coast, and Togo

privatization of two textile

Upper Volta Second

mills

-

Education project
-

1987

-

-

Announcement of first

Agricultural extension project

(performance assessment)

(to strengthen the existing

Agricultural support services

extension services in areas of

project

four of the five regional
directorates, seeks to introduce
the main elements of the
training and visit system:
systemic visits to groups of
farmers, regular training of
extension staff, improved
linkages between extension
and research, proper
monitoring and evaluation,
efficient management systems
at both national and regional
levels, technology transfers
focused on simple low risk
changes in agriculture
methods)
-

Private enterprise development
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project (support the
government’s policy of
fostering a stronger private
sector through the
introduction of appropriate
policy and institutional and
financial measures; four
components: establish new
institutional support system to
provide promotional and
extension services to private
enterprises, provide support
for the ongoing govt program
of privatization of parastatals, a
pilot scheme for
microenterprise lending in
collaboration with NGOs/
PVOs, and a line of credit to
finance fixed investments and
working capital of existing
enterprises and new projects)
-

Togo, Ivory Coast, and Upper
Volta agricultural and rural
development projects

-

Transport rehabilitation
project

-

Feeder roads project
(completion report)

-

Third structural adjustment
program
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1989

-

The effects of river blindness 1988

-

and migration on rural

in Burkina Faso, Togo, and the

agriculture: the case of some

Ivory Coast

onchocerciasis control

-

program in some areas of
Burkina Faso
-

-

Cotton Sector Development
Project

-

Upper Volta Niena Dionkele
rice development project

-

Cotton development programs

Education project (completion
report)

-

First and second technical

Burkina Faso second Urban

assistance and structural

project

adjustment project (project

Burkina Faso economic

performance assessment

memorandum

report)
-

Grassroot development
initiatives project (Grant
financing for NGOs
sponsored community-based
projects, technical support
services fo the steering
committee for review and
evaluation of project proposals
and implementation
monitoring, assistance to
programme de devloppement
local et participatif/ NGO
division to provide an effective
government liaison and
resource center for project
management, assistance to
NGO community to
strengthen coordination and
complimentary among NGOs.
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1990

-

-

-

-

Upper volta forestry project

1989

-

Preinvestment project (to

(project completion report

reduce the immediate

with mixed results)

constraints on investment

Upper-volta second

caused by the lack of properly

Bourguiba agricultural

prepared projects and to create

development project

institutional capacity for

(completion report)

identifying investment

Upper volta hauts bassins

proposals and processing these

agricultural development

through feasibility studies

project (completion report)

obtaining financing and

Upper volta third

establishing final project

telecommunications project

execution plans. Investment

(completion report)

preparation component in the
format of feasibility studies
and detailed execution plans
included in the government’s
triennial public investment
project. Sectoral priorities
component in the form of
studies and training to
supplement present knowledge
of sectoral investment
priorities.

1991

-

-

Burkina Faso koudougou

1990

-

Telecommunications project

-

Second cocoa and coffee

agricultural pilot project

development project

(completion report)

(completion report)

Environmental management

-

Second structural adjustment

project (staff appraisal and

program (project performance

recommendations of the

assessment report)
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president)
-

Fourth education project

-

Upper volta volta noire

-

(project completion report)
-

agricultural development
project (completion report)
-

Feeder roads and highway
project

-

Power rehabilitation and

Public works and

extension project (streamlining

employment project

the relationship between

Urban household energy

Compagnie Energie Electrique

strategy

du Togo and the government

Burkina Faso structural

reinforcing CEET’s

adjustment program project

organization and effecting

(focused on public resource

improvements in all aspects of

management and private

operations and financing part

sector incentives, The private

of the investment program of

sector incentives component

the power sector for ‘90-’94)

addresses public enterprise

-

Fourth highway project

-

Technical education and

sector restructuring, banking

vocational training report

sector restructuring, and

(restructuring technical

trade and regulatory reform.

education and vocational

The public sector resource

training by strengthening

management component

ministry of technical education

includes restructuring

and vocational training

recurrent budget expenditure

directorates, creating a labor

to support human resource

market information system,

development, preparation of

and monitoring the VET

a civil service management

program, training of sector

reform, and improved

personnel, national training

investment programming.)

fund: creating the managerial

Transport sector adjustment

structures and fund training

investment project

activities)
-

Fourth structural adjustment
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program
-

Population and health sector
adjustment program (aimed at
assuring a satisfactory level of
primary health care and family
planning services to the
population. Instituting better
sector planning. Improving
personnel and financial
management in the sector.
Instituting cost recovery and
improving beneficiary
participation in management of
services)

-

Phosphate engineering and
technical assistance project
(completion report)

1992

-

Public institutional

-

-

Second rural development

development project

project in cotton areas

Food security and nutrition

(completion report)

project
-

1993

-

Third structural adjustment

Training and Visit system has

program project (assessment

a high payoff report

report)

Perkoa Mining exploration

-

and technical assistance
project (completion report)

Lomé water supply project
(completion report)

-

Third coffee and cocoa
development project
(completion report)

-

Power, engineering technical
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assistance, and Nangbeto
Hydroelectric projects
(completion report)
1993

-

-

-

-

Private sector assistance

1994

-

Urban development project

project (focused on

(execution of priority urban

institutional development of

works having optimal impact

government agencies

on the employment and

delivering administrative

incomes of the poor,

services to the private sector

promotion of small contractors

and financial intermediaries.

in the construction sector,

Also focused on deepening

active participation of local

financial intermediaries)

residents, community groups,

Upper volta third rural

and NGOs in the

development project

neighborhood environment

(completion report)

improvement activities,

Burkina Faso public

strengthening the ability of the

expenditure review

local government to administer

Engineering credit for the

the city, lay the groundwork

Ouagadougou water supply

for innovations in urban

project

environmental management,

Fourth highway project

contribute to poverty

(completion report)

alleviation)

Review of policies, strategies,
and programs in the

-

Educational improvement
project (completion report)

traditional energy sector
-

Case studies in financing
quality basic education

-

National environmental
action plan

-

Review of World Bank’s
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efforts to assist African
governments in reducing
poverty
-

Evaluation of training and
visit based extension in
Burkina Faso
1995

-

Third technical assistance
project (completion report)

-

Education rehabilitation
project (designed to reverse
rapid deterioration in the
education sector after several
years of socio-political unrest
which resulted in declining
enrollment and quality.
Development of better schools
through construction and
rehab, provision of textbooks
and the quality of schools
initiative, development of
better education system
management through
decentralized recruitment and
financing of teachers,
development of system
management tools including
information and
communication systems,
budgetary programming and
monitoring, consolidation of
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the ministerial restructuring by
strengthening decision making
processes and further
decentralization responsibility
for instructional and financial
management)
-

Fourth structural adjustment
project

-

Private enterprise development
project (completion and
results)

-

Agricultural extension project
(completion and results)

Sources: “World Bank Projects in Burkina Faso.” World Bank.
https://projects.worldbank.org/en/projects-operations/projects-summary.
“World Bank Projects in Togo.” World Bank. https://projects.worldbank.org/en/projectsoperations/projects-summary (July 30, 2021).
Table 2: Burkina Faso Transactions with the IMF
Total Purchases and Loans
Year

Disbursements

Repayments

Charges and Interest
Paid

1984

0

538,817

58,752

1985

0

2,135,834

51,386

1986

0

2,531,034

39,223

1987

0

2,531,034

14,758
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1988

0

2,306,130

20,331

1989

0

1,453,400

9,781

1990

0

395,200

2,733

1991

6,320,000

49,085

25,143

1992

0

0

31,603

1993

8,840,000

0

63,207

1994

17,680,000

0

48,730

1995

17,680,000

0

151,730

1996

6,630,000

632,000

374,671

1997

13,260,000

1,264,000

316,871

1998

13,260,000

2,148,000

366,353

Sources: “Burkina Faso: Transactions with the Fund.” International Monetary Fund.
https://www.imf.org/external/np/fin/tad/extrans1.aspx?memberKey1=95&endDate=2099%2D1
2%2D31&finposition_flag=YES (June 17, 2021).
Table 3: Togo Transactions with the IMF:
Total purchases and loans
Year

Disbursements

Repayments

Charges and Interest
Paid

1984

16,000,000

4,840,462

2,277,952

1985

15,000,000

10,893,483

4,286,448

1986

12,000,000

5,777,541

4,301,200
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1987

0

13,687,770

4,231,113

1988

18,040,000

20,283,728

3,591,123

1989

18,000,000

18,506,724

3,587,266

1990

15,360,000

11,621,858

2,972,651

1991

0

5,830,673

2,331,684

1992

7,680,000

7,153,806

1,506,484

1993

0

5,946,047

942,741

1994

10,860,000

4,690,665

302,645

1995

21,720,000

7,326,843

340,185

1996

0

7,899,999

500,137

1997

10,860,000

8,448,000

324,411

1998

10,860,000

8,448,000

359,987

Sources: “Togo: Transactions with the Fund.” International Monetary Fund.
https://www.imf.org/external/np/fin/tad/extrans1.aspx?memberKey1=950&endDate=2099%2D
12%2D31&finposition_flag=YES (June 17, 2021).
Table 4: GDP Growth Per Capita (2010 USD)
Year

Burkina Faso

Togo

1986

5.195

-1.738

1987

-2.803

-2.637
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1988

3.058

3.491

1989

-0.511

1.2

1990

-3.211

-2.774

1991

6.189

-2.98

1992

-2.43

-5.998

1993

0.696

-16.848

1994

-1.411

12.427

1995

2.835

5.149

1996

7.987

5.77

1997

3.398

10.881

1998

4.342

-5.39

Sources: “GDP per Capita Growth (Annual %) - Burkina Faso | Data.” World Bank.
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.KD.ZG?locations=BF.
“GDP per Capita Growth (Annual %) - Togo | Data.” World Bank.
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.KD.ZG?locations=TG.
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Table 5: GDP Per Capita
Year

Burkina Faso

Togo

1986

398.173

592.225

1987

387.014

576.61

1988

398.848

566.737

1989

396.811

603.898

1990

348.069

587.145

1991

407.838

569.65

1992

397.926

535.482

1993

400.694

445.265

1994

395.041

500.598

1995

406.311

526.375

1996

438.765

556.747

1997

453.674

617.326

77

1998

473.372

584.054

Sources: “GDP per Capita (Constant 2010 US$) - Togo | Data.” World Bank.
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.KD?locations=TG.
“GDP per Capita (Constant 2010 US$) - Burkina Faso | Data.” World Bank.
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.KD?locations=BF.
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Appendix 2
MAPS:
Figure 1 Map of Distribution of Malaria in Africa

Source: “The Malaria Atlas Project.” MAP. https://www.tki-dev.malariaatlas.org/ .
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Figure 2 Map of Burkina Faso

Source: “Free Burkina Faso Provinces Map | Provinces Map of Burkina Faso | Burkina Faso Country
Provinces Map Open Source | Mapsopensource.Com.”
http://www.mapsopensource.com/burkina-faso-provinces-map.html .
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Figure 3 Map of Togo

Source: “Togo Map (Political) - Worldometer.” https://www.worldometers.info/maps/togopolitical-map/.
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